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TEXTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
SCRIVENER’S ERROR
John David Ohlendorf∗
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1876, the Ohio General Assembly passed an act intended to
revise and regulate the exercise of local police power in “cities . . . having at the
last federal census a population of two hundred thousand and over.”1 The act
conferred general regulatory authority on a board of police commissioners to be
appointed, for each city, by the Governor of the state.2 Besides giving each police
board control over the local police force, the act also gave the new boards “all the
powers now vested in the board of health,”3 and so as part of the overhaul, section
18 of the act attempted to abolish all existing board of health offices.4 But a hitch
somewhere in the process resulted in a drafting infelicity: the final language of
Section 18 stated that “The officers of the board of health in cities to which this act
is applicable . . . are hereby abolished.”5
One suspects that the venerable doctrine of ita lex scripta est was not held in
such high regard in late 19th century Ohio that the officers serving on the existing
local boards of health feared for their lives. In State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Covington, the authority of the newly-created police and public-health boards of
Cincinnati was challenged in a quo warranto action.6 The Attorney General, acting
as relator for the state, argued that the 1876 statute was unconstitutional on grounds
unrelated to the unfortunate 18th section, but the attorneys for the Attorney General
apparently found in section eighteen an opportunity to introduce some humor into
the courtroom, as well as take an additional jab at the statute: “Just what
‘abolished,’ as used in this section, was intended by the legislature to mean,” the
attorneys noted, “might puzzle almost any one who would consult the dictionary
for the technical definition of the word.”7 The counsel for the Cincinnati officials
in defense, in a quite different spirit (apparently not finding the humor in the
prospect of their clients being “abolished”) dryly responded:
[t]he eighteenth section of the act in question abolishes certain offices, as the
legislature might properly do. The objection to this section is a mere play upon
letters. The section has no sense, unless the word ‘officers’ is read ‘offices.’ To
8
abolish officers is to abolish offices, and can mean nothing else.

∗ Olin-Searle-Smith Fellow in Law, Northwestern University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School. The author would like to thank John Manning for peerless advice and insight and for comments
on several earlier drafts. Any drafting errors or absurdities are of course my own.
1. Act of March 24, 1876, 73 Ohio Laws 70.
2. Id. §§ 1–2.
3. Id. § 2.
4. Id. § 18.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. 29 Ohio St. 102, 103 (Ohio 1876).
7. Id. at 105.
8. Id. at *110.
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The court apparently agreed, correcting the error in an almost off-hand way.9
I suppose that scrivener’s errors, like this one, make an easy prey for the gentle
comedy of the bench and bar, much in the way that typographical errors in
billboards, newspaper headlines, and church bulletins form an endless source of
humor for late night talk show hosts. But theorists of legal interpretation have long
seen that scrivener’s errors pose a more serious problem. The doctrine surrounding
scrivener’s error stands considered as something of a cousin to the absurdity
doctrine, which has roots extending to the earliest days of the American Republic.10
More recently, the post-legal-process revival of formalist approaches to statutory
interpretation on the bench, and their systematic defense in the academy, has made
the problem of scrivener’s error increasingly relevant.
The problem for a thoroughgoing and consistent textualism is fairly obvious:
textualists argue that the text passed by both houses of Congress and duly signed
by the President (or passed, over his veto, by the requisite supermajorities) is the
exclusive source of law.11 But what is the textualist to do, then, when the text that
makes it through these hurdles includes gaffes—like the Louisiana statute that
allowed parties to impeach their opponent’s testimony, on cross examination, “in
any unlawful way,”12 or the Arkansas law (Hart and Sacks’ chestnut) that treated
the court stenographer’s transcript as a bill of exceptions on appeal until approved
by the Chancellor, rather than after being so approved?13 In many cases of
scrivener’s error, the legislative history makes plain that the suspicious wording
was unintentional, but it is a familiar and central part of the textualist credo that it
is the text of the law, and not the legislative history, that governs.14 Often, a literal
reading of an erroneous text will lead to patent absurdities, but some textualists
have challenged the validity of the absurdity doctrine, as well.15 Is the textualist
judge really left trying to “abolish” state officers and allowing unlawful
impeachment of witnesses?
If textualist theory rightly bars “imaginative
reconstruction”16 based on legislative history and reinterpretation to avoid absurd
results, is there conceptual room left for a doctrine of scrivener’s error?
These questions are important ones, but surprisingly there has been a marked
lack of effort, on the part of textualists, to answer them. Aside from a handful of
attempts,17 textualist theorists have been either unconcerned or uninterested in the
9. See id. at 117.
10. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2388, 2388–89 (2003). I go
on to challenge the relationship between the two doctrines. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
11. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
12. See Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938).
13. See Johnson v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 229 S.W.2d 671, 672–73 (Ark. 1950).
14. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 11, at 29–37; John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684–95 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 86–117 (2006).
15. See Manning, supra note 10, at 2390.
16. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 101–05, 273–78 (1990).
17. Manning’s discussion of the problem is the best treatment of the issue to date, and it consists of
a single footnote. Manning, supra note 10, at 2459 n.265. The three extended academic treatments of
the problem of which I am aware, Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener’s Error, 52 RUTGERS L. REV.

122

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

problem; even critics of textualism seem to have placed little emphasis on the
threat posed by scrivener’s error to textualist theory.18 Textualist judges, who
come face to face with actual examples of scrivener’s error, have gone a bit farther
in articulating an approach to the problem,19 but it is hardly within their province to
treat its conceptual moorings, theoretical implications, and evidentiary difficulties
in any systematic way. The result has been a textualist approach to the problem
that is unsatisfactory in significant respects.20
This neglect is unfortunate. Scrivener’s error poses a significant challenge to
textualist theories of interpretation, and if textualism cannot come up with an
adequate answer to the problem of scrivener’s error, it is prima facie an
unsatisfactory theory of statutory interpretation.21 Moreover, how textualists
answer the challenge posed by scrivener’s error has the deepest implications for the
theoretical foundations of textualism. Finding conceptual room for a doctrine of
scrivener’s error within a textualist theory that rejects reliance on legislative history
and the absurdity doctrine goes to the very root of what divides textualists from
intentionalists.22
The burden of this article is to provide conceptual moorings for a textualist
doctrine of scrivener’s error, to relate the problem of drafting errors to broader
textualist theory, and to suggest how the theory of scrivener’s error advocated here
might make a difference in practice. In Part II, I briefly sketch the division in
textualist theory between those who offer “intent-skeptical” justifications for
textualism and those who prefer “non-intent-skeptical” arguments. Part III takes up
again the task already begun: describing the challenge posed by scrivener’s error to
textualist theory. I review two attempts by textualists to address the scrivener’s
error problem, concluding that both ultimately fail, but in illuminating ways.
Finally, in Part IV I lay out my own theory of scrivener’s error, grounded in a nonintent-skeptical understanding of textualism that draws heavily on the work of
Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron, and sketch how this newly-grounded doctrine
589 (2000); Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 25 (2006); and David M. Sollors, The Scrivener’s Error Doctrine and Textual Criticism:
Confronting Errors in Statutes and Literary Texts, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 459 (2009), have evoked
little response.
18. There have been scattered attempts to use scrivener’s error as a cudgel with which to beat
textualists, see, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 377–83 (2005); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 45–48 (1994); Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an
Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 979–82 (2004); Recent Case, Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v.
Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 105 HARV. L. REV. 2116 (1992), but no opponent of textualism
seems to have laid out, in any systematic way, the challenge that Scrivener’s error poses to the theory.
The most systematic treatment of the problem is Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors
Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001).
19. See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States
v. X-Citement, Inc. Video, 513 U.S. 64, 82–83 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Amalgamated Transit Union Local
1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting).
20. See infra Part IV.C.
21. This is a bold claim, but I believe it is justified. See infra Part III.A.
22. The turn of phrase is, of course, brazenly appropriated from John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
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will look when put into the field against the different types of scrivener’s errors that
are encountered by judges.
II. TEXTUALIST THEORY AND INTENT SKEPTICISM
Textualism might be defined roughly as that method of statutory interpretation
that assigns to statutory texts the meaning that a reasonable person, familiar with
the conventions of language generally in use by members of the relevant linguistic
community, as well as any more idiosyncratic terms of art and general structural
conventions used by the legislature, would understand the words of the text to
have. Textualists “stick close to the surface meaning of texts, where possible,”23
eschewing, on the one hand, the legislative history of the provision24 and, on the
other, broader attributions of legislative purpose that go beyond the scope of the
text itself.25 Scholars have offered many different justifications for the family of
interpretive theories that are broadly textualist. For our purposes, these diverse
arguments may be classified into two camps: intent-skeptical and non-intentskeptical.
Intent-skeptical arguments for textualism center on the air of paradox
surrounding the idea of collective intent. Can Congress—a group of discrete
individuals but not an individual itself—meaningfully be said to have a unified
intent? These intent-skeptical arguments form the oldest and the most familiar
class of justifications for textualism. The general argument is often traced back, in
its modern form, to the legal realist Max Radin,26 but of course the argument is
much older than this—Joseph Story was hardly expressing a novel idea when, in
his 1833 Commentaries, he derisively asked: “What would be said of interpreting a
statute of a State legislature by endeavoring to find out, from private sources, the
objects and opinions of every member, how every one thought, what he wished,
how he interpreted it? Suppose different persons had different opinions, what is to
be done?”27
In the modern debate, this intent-skeptical objection has found prominent
exponents in Justice Scalia28 and Judge Easterbrook. Easterbrook has shored up

23. VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 73.
24. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 29 (stating that “the objective indication of the words, rather than
the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law”).
25. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (“[N]o legislation pursues its
purposes at all costs.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63–64 (1988).
26. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“A legislature
certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted,
which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might
have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.”).
27. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 310 n.1
(Little, Brown and Co. 1891) (1833). Story was attacking two canons of construction that Jefferson had
recommended for constitutional interpretation.
28. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 32 (“[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction
reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are
bound to be false. Those issues almost invariably involve points of relative detail, compared with the
major sweep of the statute in question. That a majority of both houses of Congress (never mind the
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the point with insights imported from public choice theory, such as Kenneth
Arrow’s theorem concerning the aggregation of group preferences.29 According to
Arrow, although transitivity is generally considered an essential component of
rational choice, given certain apparently reasonable conditions a multi-member
body choosing from among three or more options will be unable to arrive at a
transitive set of preferences (it may prefer A to B to C to A . . .).30 Because the
ordering of group preferences is intransitive, if members are allowed continually to
challenge the preceding vote, the legislature will cycle endlessly between the
alternatives until it is stopped arbitrarily by, for example, fatigue or agenda
control.31 Easterbrook concludes that “[b]ecause legislatures comprise many
members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable. Each
member may or may not have a design. The body as a whole, however, has only
outcomes.”32 The text of the statute is the only aggregation of congressional
preferences we have: attempting to recreate some “legislative intent” underlying
the text is ultimately chimerical.
Although this argument has done yeoman’s work in support of textualist
theory, it is subject to several powerful rejoinders. First, the conditions necessary
to make the theorem work often may not be met.33 Second, as Professor Manning
notes, even if collective intent is an empty concept, the use of legislative history
might be justified in terms of delegation.34 Third, it is not clear that the idea of
collective intent is as bankrupt as textualists like Easterbrook have suggested. As
Judge Posner has argued, “it is possible to overdo one’s skepticism in this regard.
Institutions act purposively, therefore they have purposes. A document can
manifest a single purpose even though those who drafted and approved it had a
President, if he signed rather than vetoed the bill) ever entertained any view with regard to such issues is
utterly beyond belief.”).
29. See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 547; Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 61, 68 (1994).
30. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2nd ed., 1963)
(suggesting that group preferences are often intransitive); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They”
Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241–44 (1992) (using
Arrow’s theorem to argue that the idea of legislative intent is meaningless); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
31. See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 547 (stating “[e]very system of voting has flaws. The one
used by legislatures is particularly dependent on the order in which decisions are made.”).
32. Id.
33. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 47–55 (1991).
34. See Manning, supra note 14, at 690–91. Manning explains that,
[P]ositivist theories of interpretation suggest that ‘legislative intent’ has little to do with
the genuine intentions of legislators, and much to do with legislators’ intentions to enact
statutes that will be interpreted according to accepted interpretive conventions. That
basic understanding of interpretive reality, which textualists ultimately share, leaves
ample room for the claim that courts rely on legislative history not because it reflects
actual intent, but because legislators now expect their ambiguities to be resolved
according to its lights. If that is the case, then one might argue that Congress implicitly
delegates law elaboration authority to committees and sponsors, when it enacts an
ambiguous statute accompanied by a committee’s or sponsor’s explanation of its
meaning.
Id. (citations omitted).
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variety of private motives and expectations.”35 We speak all the time about
collectives—such as clubs, corporations, armies, or even whole nations—as
intentionally or purposively pursuing certain goals or projects, some of them quite
specific and detailed. The concept of group intent, then, doesn’t seem to be
entirely empty.
Finally, Arrovian intransitivity and Condorcetian circles36 may make us
question whether committee reports reflect a genuine group ordering of
preferences, but they do so at the cost of making all collective choices seem
irrational, including the choice of statutory text.37 If, as I shall argue in Part IV,
authority is generally a matter of epistemic deference—following the value
choices38 made by agents we have reason to believe are capable of coming to a
more accurate or more robust understanding of moral reality than we—then it is
hard to see why we should obey this type of Congress at all: indeed, it is hard to see
how any form of government other than monarchy is possible (or at least
attractive). Intent-skeptical arguments are designed to show the undesirability of
recourse to legislative history, but these arguments are themselves, in a way,
undesirable: they seem to lead to a general weakening of the moral authority of the
law itself.
But if intent skepticism begins to look less than compelling—or even
undesirable—does the appeal of textualism begin to vanish as well? The short
answer is “no”: not all justifications for textualism are based on skepticism about
legislative intent. Textualists have offered a number of non-intent-skeptical
arguments for the textualist approach; these arguments urge that, even if the
concept of legislative intent is meaningful in some minimal sense, there are good
reasons to “stick close to the surface meaning of texts,”39 gleaning what we can
about what the legislature intended from the text and structure of the law in front of
us. Professor Manning has offered one such argument, and later I will offer a nonskeptical argument of my own, built up from the parts of existing textualist theory I
find the most compelling.40 For the present, what we have said about intentskeptical and non-skeptical justifications of textualism is enough to illustrate a
central divide within textualist theory. With this sketch of the terrain in hand, let us
35. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 195–96 (1986); accord Joseph Raz, Intention in
Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 263 (Robert P. George
ed., 1996) (“We find no problem in attributing intentions to corporations, groups, and institutions in
ordinary life . . . .”).
36. The endless cycling of group preferences that results from the intransitivity predicted by Arrow,
see supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text, is often referred to as a “Condorcet circle” because it was
first described by the 18th-century thinker Marquis de Condorcet in his book ESSAI SUR L’APPLICATION
DE L’ANALYSE À LA PROBABILITÉ DES DÉCISIONS RENDUES À LA PLURALITÉ DES VOIX (1775).
37. Including, as Farber and Frickey urge (and Easterbrook himself acknowledges), choices made
by courts. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 33, at 55. See also Easterbrook, supra note 30.
38. Laws do more than express brute value choices, of course—they create causes of action, they
allocate funds, they set up institutions, etc. Because most of these actions crucially involve choices
between values, however, I shall use the term “value choice” as shorthand for the legally operative
content, of any type, expressed by legislation.
39. VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 73.
40. See infra Part IV and notes 95-104 for a discussion of Professor Manning’s argument for
textualism; see infra Part IV and notes 162-79 for a sketch of my own argument.
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return to the problem of scrivener’s error and see what implications it might have
for this foundational debate over skepticism, as well as for the appeal of textualism
generally.
III. THE PROBLEM OF SCRIVENER’S ERROR: THRUSTS AND PARRIES
A. The Challenge
In this article’s introduction, I mentioned three cases involving statutes that
contained scrivener’s errors: the Ohio statute that abolished public health officers,
the Louisiana statute that allowed unlawful impeachment of witness testimony, and
the Arkansas statute that made the trial transcript authoritative until approved by
the Chancellor. Let me give two further examples to help highlight the problem
that scrivener’s error poses for any theory of statutory interpretation.
The 1874 case Maxwell v. State41 dealt with a Maryland statute that provided
for “the general valuation and assessment of property in this state.”42 The statute
was long and complex, and there were problems from the very beginning. Section
One of the statute evidently intended to provide that all property was subject to
taxation, except for property falling within eighteen classes of exceptions. That
this was the legislature’s intention was apparent from the summaries in the
margins, which stated: “Property of all kinds shall be taxed” next to the opening
clause and “Exempt” next to the following eighteen clauses.43 Further, the classes
of exempt property included categories of property that one would expect to be
exempt from taxation, such as “property belonging . . . to houses for public
worship”; “all graveyards, cemeteries, and burying-grounds”; and “public
hospitals, asylums and other incorporated literary, charitable or benevolent
institutions for the relief of the indigent or afflicted.”44
The problem was with the text of the bill, which provided that “all property
real, personal and mixed, of all kinds and descriptions whatever in this State”—
except property in the eighteen classes of exceptions—“shall be exempt from
taxation for State or local purposes.”45 So the act, on its face, made all real
property exempt from taxation, except for the property in the eighteen classes
belonging to charities, churches, and the like. Something had gone terribly wrong,
it seemed; surely the Maryland legislature meant to say that all property except
property belonging to one of the exceptions shall be subject to taxation. The
Maryland Court of Appeals, in Maxwell, while acknowledging that it felt “quite
sure [that] the Legislature intended to say something very different,”46 dutifully
followed the plain meaning rule47 and held that the act meant what it said, making
it unconstitutional48 under Article Fifteen of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights,

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

40 Md. 273 (Md. 1874).
Act of Apr. 11, 1874, ch. 514, 1874 Md. 853.
Id. § 1.
Id.
Id.
Maxwell, 40 Md. at 292.
See id. at 291–94.
See id. at 294.
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which stated that “every . . . person in the State . . . ought to contribute his
proportion of public taxes . . . .”49
My second example centers around 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), which classifies
certain offenses as “aggravated felonies” for purposes of deportation or
immigration. Subparagraphs F and G of paragraph 43 define the term “aggravated
felony” to include “a crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment at
least one year” and “a theft offense . . . or burglary offense for which the term of
imprisonment at least one year.”50
As several courts have noted, both
subparagraphs are “obviously missing a crucial verb,”51 but no court has had
difficulty in concluding that the missing verb, probably an “is,” is merely a
“drafting snafu” that poses no constitutional problems.52
This second example points up the problem for textualism most starkly,
because here it is quite impossible to interpret subparagraphs F and G according to
their “surface meaning.” If textualism draws the meaning of a statutory text from
the words alone, understood as a reasonable person would understand them in
context, then that enterprise seems impossible for these provisions. They are,
simply put, unmeaning. They are syntactically deviant, like Chomsky’s “colorless
green ideas sleep furiously.”53 The reasonable reader is unable to draw any
meaning out of them whatsoever.
Textualism’s standard methodology for interpreting statutory text fails in the
case of errors that result in deviances like missing verbs. If textualism asks judges
to apply its standard methodology to these cases, it will be incoherent; if it simply
ignores these cases, it will be incomplete, since it will have failed to specify an
interpretive method for every type of statutory text that courts will foreseeably be
called upon to interpret. To be a complete and coherent account of statutory
interpretation, textualism needs to provide some method for dealing with these
cases other than its standard method, even if this method is nothing more than
Judge Bork’s “ink blot” strategy of acting as if inscrutable text had never been
enacted.54
Where the error results not in an unmeaning text but in a text with a very
unlikely meaning, the challenge posed to textualism is less brazen but still
compelling. A textualist judge can certainly interpret a statute as exempting all
property from taxes based on its plain meaning, as the court in Maxwell did, even
though the statute is obviously meant to impose a tax. There is no gap in the
textualist methodology, here, but even the most stout-hearted textualist is likely to
feel a little queasy.
The source of this queasiness, I think, is that textualists see themselves as
faithful agents of the legislature and it is obvious that the legislature meant
49. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XV (1864).
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (F) & (G) (2006).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 790 (3rd Cir. 1999).
52. See United States v. Banda-Zamora, 178 F.3d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1999). Accord Graham, 169
F.3d at 790–91; United States v. Pancheo, 225 F.3d 148, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Maldonado-Ramirez, 216 F.3d 940, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2000).
53. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15 (1968).
54. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
166 (1990).
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something else, here. If, as I shall suggest a little later, legislative supremacy, like
much authority, is a case of epistemic deference,55 then it makes little sense to defer
to a choice that the legislature so clearly did not intend to make. Deferring to the
considered value choices of the legislature when those choices have emerged from
a legislative process designed to insure openness, mutual compromise, and
deliberation seems perfectly reasonable. Ordinarily, I will argue, the single best
place to look for these choices is the text of the statute.56 But when the choice
embedded in the statute is one that the legislature clearly did not intend to make
and it is clear which contrary choice the legislature did intend to make, following
the text does not make one the legislature’s faithful agent.
Moreover, the costs of strictly following the standard methodology can be
quite vivid. The costs of striking down a tax statute as unconstitutional because of
a scrivener’s error are very real: the state will be forced to forgo this revenue until
the legislature corrects the statute (a correction which, of course, also entails certain
costs). We can certainly imagine errors that would cause much higher costs. More
to the point, these costs are being imposed for reasons that seem easily avoidable:
when it is clear what Congress actually intended to write, the fix seems painless
enough.57 An interpretive theory that fails to provide for the correction of
55. See infra notes 151–153 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.
57. Professor Nagle, in a thoughtful article, has disputed this point. See John Nagle, Textualism’s
Exceptions, 15 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2002), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/
art15 [hereinafter Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions]; see generally John Copeland Nagle, Corrections
Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996). Nagle argues that the costs of the scrivener’s error exception to
the plain meaning rule (and, relatedly, of the absurdity doctrine) outweigh the benefits. Nagle gives
three types of costs associated with the exceptions, which “(1) conflict with the theoretical argument for
textualism; (2) undermine the need for, and likelihood of, legislative correction of statutory mistakes;
and (3) encourage claims of absurdity and drafting error that consume the precious time and other
resources of judges, attorneys, and litigants alike.” Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, at 2. Category (1)
clearly assumes that the scrivener’s error doctrine is in theoretical conflict with textualism; it is the
burden of this article to argue the contrary. The cost represented by category (3) is fairly trivial and is
unlikely to hold up its end if correcting scrivener’s error turns out to be even mildly beneficial. By
analogy, surely Nagle wouldn’t attack the “self-defense” affirmative defense to battery on the ground
that litigants and courts end up wasting their time arguing whether or not the defendant was acting in
self-defense.
Category (2) costs pose a more difficult problem. Nagle’s argument here is similar to the fear
that judicial review will dampen Congress’ incentive to pass only constitutional statutes—a
phenomenon that Adrian Vermeule aptly has called “a form of moral hazard.” VERMEULE, supra note
14, at 261. This also goes to Nagle’s benefits estimate: he argues that the usefulness of judicial error
correction is limited, since other institutional actors can correct the errors instead. Nagle, Textualism’s
Exceptions, at 8–12. Three observations seem in order, here. First, I am not entirely sure that legislative
apathy will be the necessary consequence of the continued correction of scrivener’s errors. While
knowledge that courts are in the error-correcting business could conceivably make Congress less
interested in the activity, it is also plausible that fear of courts mistaking its true intentions might make
Congress more interested in supervising the activity. Second, it’s not clear that more judicial and less
legislative correction of errors is categorically undesirable. To be sure, if all scrivener’s errors are
considered as a class, Congress is probably the more-efficient error corrector, since it is plausibly in the
best position to determine whether it made a drafting error. Some errors, however, are relatively easily
and conclusively discovered. Below, I advocate restricting permissible judicial correction of scrivener’s
errors to these cases, where the evidence of error is near-conclusive. For this class of errors, the
judiciary might well be the most-efficient error corrector. The optimal approach might be some sort of
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scrivener’s errors like the one in Maxwell is, I think, pro tanto less desirable than
one that does so provide.
If textualists are unable to articulate a theory of scrivener’s error compatible
with textualism, then, textualism itself may seem undesirable at best and incoherent
or incomplete at worst. Moreover, if only some justifications for textualism are
compatible with a satisfactory solution to the scrivener’s error problem, this
constitutes a reason for favoring these justifications over the justifications that are
not able to accommodate a solution to the problem. Before we reach this point,
though, we need to see if textualism is actually compatible with an answer to the
problem of scrivener’s error. As a first cut at determining this, I briefly survey the
existing textualist solutions to the scrivener’s error problem. I conclude that each
of these existing solutions is unsatisfactory and go on to articulate my own
solution, which aspires to build on the successes of the existing approaches while
avoiding their failings.
B. Existing Textualist Approaches: Review and Critique
Before reviewing the existing textualist approaches to scrivener’s error, I pause
to emphasize a point that came out in the discussion above: textualists see
themselves as operating within the confines of the faithful agent approach. Later, I
will argue that there are good reasons for this, reasons that stem from the moral
authority of law itself.58 For now, it should be sufficient to note that textualists
have traditionally seen themselves as operating within the faithful agent paradigm59
and that a fair reading of the text, structure, and history of the Constitution would
seem to be compatible with the faithful agent theory.60

division of labor between the judicial and legislative branches. Third, Nagle’s institutional point is
subject to an institutional counterpoint. Even assuming that concerted judicial refusal to correct drafting
errors would result in greater congressional error-correction and that this would be a good thing, an
individual judge, faced with an uncorrected scrivener’s error, does not have the power to effect the type
of concerted judicial action necessary to bring this benefit about. The benefit that might result if all
judges refused to correct errors is not “marginal and divisible,” VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 118–32,
261–62, in such a way that an individual judge’s choice not to correct would bring about any portion of
this benefit. For an individual judge, the decision is between correcting this error or declining to do so.
On the benefits side, Nagle asserts that the scrivener’s error exception is employed in very few
cases, but he comes to this conclusion by looking only at those scrivener’s errors that current textualists
would correct. Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, at 5–6. To the extent that the underlying argument is
over whether existing textualist theory justifies correction of scrivener’s errors either too seldom or too
frequently, there is something circular about basing a benefits estimate on the current practice of
textualist judges in this respect. Finally, if the central argument of this article is correct, Nagle ignores
the most important benefit of all: when textualists fail to correct a scrivener’s error, they are failing to
defer to the actual value choices of the legislature. On the premises of the faithful agent theory,
eliminating this failure would result in a superior allocation of epistemic deference and therefore would
be a substantial benefit.
58. See infra Part IV.A.
59. See Manning, supra note 22, at 95–96;
60. Compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2001) (arguing that the faithful agent theory is mandated by the structure and history of the
Constitution), with William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001) (arguing that the
history of the Constitution condones a more eclectic, cooperative approach to statutory interpretation).
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For a textualist approach to scrivener’s error to be textualist, then, it must
operate within the confines of the faithful agent theory. I emphasize this now
because, as the following discussion of the purportedly textualist approaches to
scrivener’s error will show, the reasons one might advance for correcting a
scrivener’s error can usefully be separated into two categories: fidelity-based and
non-fidelity-based. A fidelity-based reason argues that a scrivener’s error should
be corrected because enforcing the statute as corrected better carries out the intent
of the legislature. So, for example, the court in Maxwell might have argued that the
tax statute should be read, contrary to the surface meaning of the text, as exempting
only specific categories of property, such as property owned by charities, from
taxation, because correcting this error better effectuates the choices that the
legislature meant to make.
On the other hand, non-fidelity-based reasons argue that a scrivener’s error
should be corrected because this advances some other goal not tethered to the
legislature’s intent. So the Maxwell court might also have argued that the error
should be corrected because exempting all property from taxation, except for
property falling within one of the eighteen exceptions, is an absurdity of
constitutional proportions. If it had taken this tack, the court would have corrected
the error not because it was acting as the legislature’s faithful agent but because it
was enforcing higher, constitutional law.
At first blush, one might expect that textualists could offer only fidelity-based
reasons if they wanted to remain within the faithful agent paradigm, but this is not
quite so. To see this, one need only recognize that textualists accept the validity of
judicial review. Judicial review is most emphatically not based on fidelity to the
legislative will, but some acceptance of judicial review is seen as compatible with
the faithful agent theory. So some deviation from the legislature’s will—some
acceptance of non-fidelity-based reasons for decision—is acceptable within the
faithful agent theory. The difficulty is to discern what exactly the minimum
content of the faithful agent theory is.
1. Manning
A good place to start the exploration of this problem is Professor Manning’s
approach to scrivener’s error. Manning has not offered any systematic theory of
scrivener’s error, but in a lengthy footnote to his article on the absurdity doctrine he
provides a few notes towards such a theory.61 To get a grasp on Manning’s
approach to scrivener’s error, we need to begin by examining his criticism of the
absurdity doctrine. First, Manning examines the absurdity doctrine as “a form of
strong intentionalism”62 and argues that it should be abandoned for the familiar
textualist reasons for resisting intentionalism: intent skepticism63 and process
concerns.64
But Manning goes on to write that “the absurdity doctrine’s legitimacy might

61.
62.
63.
64.

See Manning, supra note 10, at 2459 n.265.
Id. at 2420.
Id. at 2408–31; see also supra notes 26–40 and accompanying text.
Manning, supra note 10, at 2431–46; see also infra notes 162–173 and accompanying text.
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rest on grounds other than legislative intent.”65 Specifically, “when judges invoke
the absurdity doctrine to avoid an unreasonable result, one might ascribe their
behavior to judicial power to ‘enrich positive law with the moral values and
practical concerns of a civilized society,’ even when such action requires displacing
clear statutory outcomes.”66 This justification cannot be parried by the textualists’
traditional tool-kit of anti-intent arguments; it must be countered by resort to “the
institutional allocation of power among the branches” of federal government.67 In
other words, justifying the absurdity doctrine in terms of judicial power implicates
the scope of the faithful agent theory.
After reviewing the original and contemporary understanding of the
constitutional structure, Manning’s conclusion is that this structure embodies “a
conception of limited judicial power that is quite difficult to square with the
absurdity doctrine’s assumptions.”68 Original understanding of “the separation of
legislative and judicial powers reflects a rule-of-law tradition that rejects ad hoc
alterations of clear and general laws,” and “the core of the post-New Deal
constitutional order” is that “when legislation does not implicate suspect
classifications or fundamental rights, the default constitutional standard of
rationality review instructs courts to respect the often-awkward lines of legislative
compromise drawn by duly enacted statutes.”69
Central to the faithful agent theory is the judiciary’s duty to suppress its own
all-things-considered judgment of the best disposition of the case at bar in
deference to the highest valid law on point. Where that law is the Constitution,
judges enforcing constitutionally entrenched value choices are acting as faithful
agents of the constitutional order, and where that law is a federal statute, the judges
should act as faithful agents of Congress. But where judges abandon Congress’s
value choices in favor of their own ideas of the good, the right, or the reasonable,
they are operating outside the faithful agent theory altogether. The gravamen of
Manning’s critique of the absurdity doctrine, then, is that where that doctrine is
justified in terms of judicial power, it runs contrary to the faithful agent theory, and
where it is justified—within the faithful agent paradigm—in terms of legislative
intent, it runs contrary to the traditional textualist arguments against strong
intentionalism.
Manning takes pains, however, to differentiate the absurdity doctrine from the
correction of scrivener’s errors; in so doing, he articulates three exemplary types of
errors which he suggests may be properly correctable: cross-reference errors, where
Congress uses a cross-reference “that, in context, could refer only to a nearby
section other than the one actually named”; the use of a particular word that
“simply [does] not make linguistic sense in the context of the sentence as a whole”;
and “common mistake[s] of grammar or punctuation that make[] linguistic
nonsense of an otherwise comprehensible sentence.”70 Manning’s impulse to
65. Manning, supra note 10, at 2431–32.
66. Id. at 2432 (quoting United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
dissenting)).
67. Id. at 2432–33.
68. Id. at 2433
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2459 n.265.
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differentiate the problem of scrivener’s error from the absurdity doctrine is
laudable; indeed, I largely accept his critique of the absurdity doctrine and agree
that any viable textualist approach to scrivener’s errors must be able to differentiate
itself from the absurdity doctrine or fall prey to the criticism of being outside the
bounds of the faithful agent theory. That said, I think that Manning’s own attempt
at differentiating the two is ultimately inconsistent with other strands of his
thought.
Begin with Manning’s three exemplary types of correctable errors. The first
type, cross-reference errors, should be ignored, because this type of error is
reductive: a mistaken cross reference is not an independent type of error; if
Congress references the wrong section of an act, the result may be an error—in
fact, the mistaken reference may make the provision unmeaning. But the mistaken
reference is only an error because of this erroneous result. Take, for example, 18
U.S.C. § 3565(b)(3), which requires courts to revoke probation and resentence a
defendant to imprisonment if “the defendant . . . refuses to comply with drug
testing, thereby violating the condition imposed by section 3563(a)(4).”71 But
§ 3563(a)(4) reads, “The court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a sentence
of probation . . . for a domestic violence crime . . . that the defendant attend a
public, private, or private nonprofit offender rehabilitation program.”72
Section 3565(b)(3) deals with defendants who fail to comply with drug testing
but references a paragraph of the code dealing with domestic violence crimes.
Next-door to § 3563(a)(4), however, is paragraph 5 of § 3563(a), which reads,
“[T]he court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a sentence of probation . . .
for a felony, a misdemeanor, or an infraction, that the defendant refrain from any
unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days
of release on probation and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter.”73 It seems far
more likely that Congress meant for § 3565(b)(3) to reference paragraph 5, rather
than paragraph 4, and simply made a reference error.74 But the point is that this
mistaken reference to paragraph 4 instead of paragraph 5 is mistaken because it
results in § 3565(b)(3)’s revocation of parole for drug-test evaders who also fail to
attend a court-ordered rehabilitation program for domestic violence offenders; it is
not mistaken because § 3565(b)(3) references § 3563(a)(4) rather than §
3563(a)(5), in and of itself. Reference errors are only errors if they result in
substantive errors.
Manning’s other two examples of correctable scrivener’s errors—word usage
and grammar errors that result in linguistic nonsense—are both errors that result in
a syntactically deviant text: like the omission of a crucial verb in 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(a)(43)(F) & (G), discussed above.75 Manning’s stated justification for
distinguishing between the absurdity doctrine and errors like these is that, while
correcting purported absurdities threatens to undo implicit legislative

71. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(b)(3) (2006).
72. Id. § 3563(a)(4).
73. Id. § 3563(a)(5).
74. See United States v. Coatoam, 245 F.3d 553, 555 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 3565(b)(3)
meant to refer to § 3563(a)(5)); accord United States v. Paul, 542 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
75. Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
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compromises,76 “there is only the remotest possibility that any such clerical mistake
reflected a deliberate legislative compromise.”77 This seems to be a fidelity-based
reason for error-correction: if it is clear that the wording of a provision is
unintended, and doesn’t represent a deliberate compromise, then courts should feel
free to correct it.
But shouldn’t this apply to non-deviant errors as well? If it is clear that the
legislature meant for witness testimony to be impeached in lawful, rather than
unlawful ways, shouldn’t the court enforce this corrected reading of the statute
despite the fact that allowing impeachment “in any unlawful way”78 is not strictly
unmeaning so long as it is clear that the wording was unintentional, and did not
reflect a deliberate compromise? Manning might respond that we can only be sure
that an implicit compromise isn’t involved when the error does result in a deviant
text. But this seems to confuse an evidentiary concern with the conceptual
distinction between scrivener’s error and absurdity. The conceptual question of
whether there is theoretical room for a doctrine of scrivener’s error separate from
the absurdity doctrine must be distinguished from the evidentiary question of how
we know when we’re confronted by a scrivener’s error.79 When the text of a
statute is deviant, it is abundantly clear that the value choice Congress intended to
make is not expressed by the surface meaning of the text, since nothing
comprehensible whatsoever is expressed by the surface meaning of the text.
Manning recognizes this. But sometimes we can be sure that non-deviant texts
contain scrivener’s errors, too, by looking at the legislative history.
A good example is 49 U.S.C. § 14704, which provides relief for certain
violations by interstate carriers. Subsection (a)(2) deals with carrier violations of
applicable regulations, providing that carriers shall be “liable for damages
sustained by a person as a result of an act or omission” that violates certain
regulations.80 It is clear that parties aggrieved by a violation of these regulations
can bring an administrative complaint to either the Secretary of Transportation or
the Surface Transportation Board,81 and courts have also interpreted this subsection
as creating a private right of action.82 Subsection (b), on the other hand, addresses
certain instances of carrier overcharging, providing that “[a] carrier . . . is liable to a
person for amounts charged that exceed the applicable rate for transportation or
service,”83 if that applicable rate is in effect under § 13702, which provides that
certain carriers, such as carriers that transport household goods, must file their rates
with the Board.84 And subsection (c) establishes that a party can elect to pursue an

76. See Manning, supra note 10, at 2421–31.
77. Id. at 2459 n. 265.
78. Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938).
79. Cf. infra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
80. 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(2) (2006).
81. Id. § 14701.
82. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. New Prime, Inc., 192 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1999);
James C. Sullivan, Private Rights of Action to Enforce the Truth-In-Leasing Regulations in Court, 32
TRANSP. L.J. 159, (2005). If a plaintiff elects to pursue § 14701’s administrative remedy, subsection
(b)(1) also provides a private right of action to enforce a final order issued by the Secretary or Board.
83. 49 U.S.C. § 14704(b).
84. Id. § 13702.
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action for overcharges under subsection (b) either by way of civil action or
administrative complaint.85
Section 14705 deals with limitation periods for these actions. Subsection (b)
provides an 18-month limitation period for “civil action[s] to recover overcharges,”
and a three-year limitation for administrative complaints regarding overcharges.86
Subsection (c) provides that “[a] person must file a[n administrative] complaint . . .
to recover damages under section 14704(b) within 2 years after the claim
accrues.”87 But § 14704(b) also deals with overcharges. So subsection (b) of
Section 14705 gives a limitation period of 3 years for administrative actions to
recover overcharges, and subsection (c) provides that administrative complaints
regarding overcharges under § 14704(b) must be filed within 2 years.
This scheme is not contradictory. As at least one court has noted, § 14705(b)’s
limitation period presumably covers administrative actions regarding all
overcharges, not just the overcharges—in violation of § 13702—covered by §
14704(b).88 So the effect of § 14705(b) and (c) is to provide a 3-year limitation
period for most administrative overcharge actions but a 2-year period for actions
regarding overcharges in violation of § 13702. Although not contradictory, this
result seems a little odd, especially considering that no provision of § 14705
provides a limitation period for § 14704(a)(2), the provision dealing with carrier
violations of regulations, leaving that provision to be governed by the default 4year limitation period from 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a).89 Legislative history provides an
explanation. The clause dealing with carrier violations of regulations, now our §
14704(a)(2), was originally placed in § 14704(b)(2), in both the House and Senate
bills.90 As part of subsection (b), this clause would have been subject to
§14705(c)’s two-year statute of limitations.91 But shortly before the bill came to
the floor, the House amended its bill to make a number of changes, including
moving the language allowing non-overcharge damages from (b)(2) to (a)(2).92
After conference committee, the House’s numbering of this clause was adopted,
apparently without realizing that the renumbering had affected the applicable
statute of limitations.93 The Surface Transportation Board itself has recognized that

85. Id. § 14704(c).
86. Id. § 14705(b).
87. Id. § 14705(c).
88. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van Lines, 556 F.3d 690, 695 (8th Cir.
2009). Moreover, it is possible that Congress intended to draw a distinction between actions for
overcharges, covered by § 14705(b), and actions for damages for exceeding the tariff rate, covered by
(c). Compare Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U.S. 403, 420 (1924) (drawing a distinction between
overcharges and damages), with United Van Lines, 556 F.3d at 694–95 (suggesting that such a
distinction is no longer relevant).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under
an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later
than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”).
90. See Sullivan, supra note 82, at 167–70.
91. Even though § 14705(c)’s limitation period applies, by its terms, to “a complaint with the Board
or Secretary,” some courts have interpreted this language as extending to civil actions. See Fitzpatrick
v. Morgan S., Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 978, 984 n.5 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
92. Fitzpatrick, 261 F.Supp.2d at 983.
93. Id.
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the numbering problem is merely a “technical error.”94
In cases like this, the text that results from the error is non-deviant, but it is
nevertheless clear from the legislative history that there has been an error—that the
curious text does not reflect an implicit legislative compromise. But if Manning’s
justification for allowing correction of scrivener’s errors is that they clearly do not
reflect deliberate compromises, he should be willing to correct an error clearly
indicated by the legislative history, unless he is unwilling to allow judges to consult
legislative history to discover an error on some collateral ground.
Manning might hold legislative history unreliable for the purposes of
establishing the existence of a scrivener’s error, for example, for the same reasons
that textualists find legislative history unreliable generally. In Part II, we saw that
these reasons could be divided into two categories: intent-skeptical and non-intentskeptical.95 I will argue at greater length in Part IV that the best non-skeptical
arguments for textualism are compatible with consulting legislative history to
determine whether a scrivener’s error has occurred.96 More importantly for present
purposes, Manning’s own argument against consulting legislative history generally
does not apply to this particular use of legislative history. To see why, we need to
take a closer look at Professor Manning’s justification for textualism.
While important strands of Manning’s thought are intent-skeptical,97
Manning’s core arguments for textualism are non-skeptical. For example,
Manning’s argument against Hart-and-Sacks-style purposivism rests not on an
argument that legislatures just cannot have purposes but instead on concern for
bicameralism and presentment, emphasizing the power these procedural protections
give to minorities to stop legislation or demand legislative compromises.98 “Giving
precedence to semantic context (when clear),” Manning writes, “is necessary to
enable legislators to set the level of generality at which they wish to express their
policies. In turn, this ability alone permits them to strike compromises that go so
far and no farther.”99
Manning’s argument against the use of legislative history is also non-skeptical.
He argues that by giving dispositive weight to legislative history, judges allow
Congress to delegate the power to resolve statutory indeterminacy—effectively, the
power to create law—to agents who act outside Article I’s bicameralism and
presentment requirements,100 constituting an unconstitutional legislative selfdelegation.101
This argument has at least two advantages over the simpler but less-articulated
textualist contention that “[w]e are governed by laws, not by the intentions of
legislators.”102 First, by suggesting that judges can properly interpret only by

94. Nat’l Ass’n of Freight Transp. Consultants, 61 Fed. Reg. 60140, 60141 n.3 (Nov. 26, 1996)
(declaratory order proceeding).
95. Supra notes 23–40 and accompanying text.
96. Infra Part IV.B.
97. See infra notes 110–116 and accompanying text.
98. See Manning, supra note 22, at 103–09; Manning, supra note 10, at 2437–38.
99. Manning, supra note 22, at 99.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
101. See Manning, supra note 14, at 695–731.
102. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993).
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looking at the text, textualists lay themselves open to the charge of inconsistency:
after all, textualists themselves look at sources external to the text of the law, such
as dictionaries, cannons of construction, and other laws.103 Indeed, unless they
intend to abandon the central teaching of philosophy of language, at least since
Wittgenstein first proclaimed that “the meaning of a word is its use in the
language,”104 that “language is intelligible by virtue of a community’s shared
conventions for understanding words in context”105 in favor of the metaphysically
implausible conceptualism of their formalist forbearers, it seems textualists must
admit that no interpretation can go forward without looking outside the four corners
of the text. The argument from the nondelegation doctrine solves this problem by
differentiating between external sources deemed permissible by textualists and
legislative history. Only consultation of the latter enables Congress to bypass the
procedural protections of bicameralism and presentment.
Second, the primitive assertion that only the text of the law can be
authoritative leaves textualists open to the rejoinder that intentionalists don’t
consider legislative history to be authoritative; they merely consider it one place to
look, among others, in determining a provision’s meaning.106 Manning’s
nondelegation argument bars this move by making any dispositive reliance on
legislative history impermissible. To see this, imagine that Congress, wishing to
make value choice ε without going through bicameralism and presentment, leaves
the statutory text indeterminate with respect to ε but embeds ε into the legislative
history. Bicameralism and presentment are circumvented whenever courts,
interpreting the statutory text, impose ε rather than decline to impose it, based on
the legislative history.
Courts need not treat the legislative history as
“authoritative,” or on par with the text; Congress is enabled to evade bicameralism
and presentment whenever the weight of the legislative history, no matter how
trivial, is by itself the deciding factor in a court’s choice to impose ε.
Manning’s nondelegation argument, then, is a powerful critique of the use of
legislative history, not subject to many of the pitfalls of other similar but more
primitive arguments. But this argument simply doesn’t cut any ice against the use
of legislative history to discover scrivener’s error. Assuming that the legislative
history demonstrates conclusively that Congress107 thought it was enacting value
choice X when in fact it enacted a text that embodied choice X´, then choice X
actually has survived the requisite procedural hurdles. X´ is, ex hypothesi, a
103. See Manning, supra note 14, at 702–05.
104. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 18 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
Blackwell Publ’g 3d ed. 2001).
105. Manning, supra note 10, at 2396; see also WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 104, at 16, 75–90, 94–95
passim.
106. See Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 585, 597–99 (1994).
107. I am assuming away the role of the President throughout this discussion. Arguably, the fact that
a President must concur in a bill before it becomes law makes it much more difficult for legislative
history to show that there is indeed an error. But there seems to be no a priori reason to doubt that it
might still be possible for legislative history to demonstrate the existence of an error. For example, a
President’s signing statement may show that he shared Congress’s understanding of the provision in
question, or the legislation may have passed by a veto-proof majority that demonstrably shared an
understanding of the text that shows a scrivener’s error has occurred.
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mistake; disallowing the use of legislative history to show that this is so does not
serve any process goals, since a consensus in favor of X already survived the
process.108
What about intent-skeptical arguments, then—do these bar the use of
legislative history to demonstrate error? The answer, I think, is yes, and this
ultimately shows that Manning’s conceptual approach to scrivener’s error is
inconsistent. My claim is that fidelity-based reasons for correcting a scrivener’s
error are incompatible with intent-skepticism. Recall that a fidelity-based reason
calls for correction of a clerical error because enforcing the text as corrected would
better carry out legislative intent. This requires belief in some fact-of-the-matter
about legislative intent, no matter how thin, that lies behind the text of the statute.
What else could it mean for the act of reading a statute against the text to be more
in line with legislative intent than reading the statute according to the text? But
intent-skepticism just is the belief that there is no fact-of-the-matter about
legislative intent separate from the enacted text.
If this is so, what are the implications for Manning’s approach to scrivener’s
error? As I argued above,109 Manning’s most notable justifications for textualism
are non-skeptical; these justifications, then, are not incompatible with a fidelitybased approach to scrivener’s error. But intent skepticism is nevertheless an
important strand of Manning’s thought. This is most apparent in his 2005 article
Textualism and Legislative Intent.110 There he argues that “the only meaningful . . .
legislative intentions are those reflected in the public meaning of the final statutory
text.”111 Although “the textualists’ view of the legislative process . . . by no means
necessitates a wholesale rejection of any useful conception of legislative intent,”112
it does necessitate rejection of “perhaps the most important premise of classical
intentionalism: the idea that behind most legislation lies some sort of policy
judgment that is meaningfully identifiable, shared by a legislative majority, and yet
imprecisely expressed in the public meaning of the text that has made its way
through Congress’s many filters.”113 Textualists, “given their assumptions about
the legislative process, necessarily believe that intent is a construct.”114 This
“objectified intent”115 is to be gathered from “the import that a reasonable person
conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would attach to the
enacted words.”116
But if this is so, if there is no “judgment that is meaningfully identifiable,
108. Manning might protest that the legislative history is strategic: a disingenuous attempt by a few
legislators to make it look like a scrivener’s error has occurred. Such an argument is ruled out for the
purposes of the above hypothetical, since I have openly assumed away any concerns about the accuracy
of the evidence of the error. However, in practice, this may be a real concern. For reasons to doubt that
the concern is warranted for some common types of legislative history, see infra notes 219–221 and
accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
110. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005).
111. Id. at 424.
112. Id. at 432.
113. Id. at 438.
114. Id. at 423.
115. Scalia, supra note 11, at 17.
116. Manning, supra note 110, at 424.
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shared by a legislative majority, and yet imprecisely expressed in the public
meaning of the text,”117 then why should we care if “there is only the remotest
possibility” that a suspicious text “reflected a deliberate legislative
compromise”?118 If there can be no meaningful conception of legislative intent that
is not constructed from the text itself, the search for textual provisions that do not
reflect genuine legislative intent just doesn’t make any sense. Manning’s proffered
justification for correcting scrivener’s errors, apparently fidelity-based, is at war
with his views on the incomprehensibility of legislative intent. And importantly,
Manning’s conception of legislative intent not only undermines the use of
legislative history to demonstrate the existence of scrivener’s errors, it undermines
the correction of errors resulting in deviance, as well. No matter how unlikely it
may be that a deviant text reflects a deliberate legislative compromise, on
Manning’s understanding of intent as a construct, this can only be beside the point,
since there is nothing behind the text to appeal to.
This may not leave Manning’s approach to scrivener’s error entirely
unmoored. Manning’s repeated emphasis on errors that make “linguistic nonsense
of an otherwise comprehensible sentence”119 points the way towards an alternative
justification for correction of scrivener’s errors, at least ones that result in deviant
texts. Correcting these deviant errors might be justified on the grounds that this is
the minimum step necessary to make any sense whatsoever out of the text in
question. For example, consider the provision of the Iowa State Tort Claims Act at
issue in Jones v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n.120 Section 25A.14 of that act
exempted the State from any liability for “any claim arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse or process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.”121 In Jones,
the plaintiffs conceded that they were bringing a claim for abuse of process, but
argued that the statute, by its terms, did not exempt such claims.122 The court
rejected this argument because “[t]he term ‘abuse of process’ has long been
recognized as an actionable tort . . . . On the other hand ‘abuse or process’ is
meaningless in the context in which it appears in the section. If we were to
recognize the literal language of the statute, we would be hard put to ascribe any
sensible meaning to the words . . . .”123
Along these lines, Manning might argue that the point isn’t that Congress
cannot be assumed to have intended to enact a text that makes no sense but rather
that no meaningful legal content at all can be drawn from the text unless the error is
corrected. Understood this way, the argument for correction is non-fidelity-based:
the judge who corrects a statute in this way is not purporting to act more closely in
line with legislative intent, he is imposing minimum conditions of meaningfulness
on the legislature so as to serve the independent value of “mak[ing] sense rather

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 438.
Manning, supra note 10, at 2459–60 n.265.
Id.
207 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1973).
IOWA CODE § 25A.14(4) (1971) (emphasis added).
Jones, 207 N.W.2d at 2.
Id.
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than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”124
While this reason is non-fidelity-based,125 I don’t think it goes beyond the
bounds of the faithful agent theory. This is so because, on the textualist’s
understanding of legislative intent as a construct built up from the text, there simply
is no meaningful legislative intent present to be faithful to, if the text is
incomprehensible. This arguably separates scrivener’s error from statutory
absurdities: while it would be incompatible with the faithful agent theory to
interpret a text against the legislative intent constructed from the fair meaning of
the text because it results in what the judge thinks is an absurdity, in the case of
deviant texts there is no legislative intent present to defer to and the best the judge
can do is either ignore the text outright or make the best sense out of it that she can.
Where the fix is obvious and easy, correcting the text might be justified by
important non-fidelity based values.
The problem with this account of scrivener’s error is not that it is unfaithful to
legislative supremacy but rather that it fails to satisfactorily solve the problem.
Imposing minimum conditions of meaningfulness on statutory texts can at most
justify the correction of deviant texts. It cannot be used to justify correcting nondeviant errors, like those in Maxwell, which mistakenly “exempted” most of the
property in the state from taxation;126 Scurto, which authorized any “unlawful”
impeachment of testimony;127 or Covington, which abolished the “officers” of
municipal health boards.128 But this class of errors contains arguably the most
significant and egregious errors we have encountered. We have already seen that
an account of statutory interpretation that cannot provide for the correction of these
types of errors is for that reason less desirable than one that can. If another
textualist account of scrivener’s error is able to deal with non-deviant errors as well
as deviant ones, it is, ceteris paribus, preferable to Manning’s.
2. Gold
Running somewhat parallel to this second interpretation of Manning’s
approach, Professor Andrew Gold has offered an alternative textualist account of
scrivener’s error. Taking off from the standard textualist search for objectified
124. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991). Scalia’s line is from a slightly
different context, of course, but it seems to fit well, here.
125. There is also an interpretation of this tack that is fidelity-based: if intent is constructed from the
meaning that a reasonable reader would derive from the text and a reasonable reader would gloss over
errors that make the text unmeaning in favor of a reading that is meaningful, then imposing minimum
conditions of meaningfulness is just a way of more faithfully adhering to intent as a construct. Since
this is essentially Professor Gold’s argument, I postpone discussion of it until the next section, see infra
Part III.B.2, where I argue that this approach cannot differentiate scrivener’s error from absurdity.
Manning’s tack could be understood as a narrower version of Gold’s argument that argues that a
“reasonable reader” would gloss over only deviant errors. Such an approach would still be unable to
justify correction of non-deviant errors; however, leaving Manning in a position perhaps somewhat
more conceptually satisfying, but functionally identical, to the position resulting from the non-fidelitybased interpretation of this line of argument.
126. See Maxwell v. State, 40 Md. 273 (Md. 1874); see supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
127. See Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938).
128. See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102 (Ohio 1876); see supra notes 6–9
and accompanying text.
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intent, Gold argues that linguistic conventions “permit judges to conclude that an
intended meaning exists without knowing what was actually intended.”129 But
occasionally, when faced with “an outcome which is so unthinkable, or a word
choice which is so clearly mistaken, that a literal interpretation of the statute’s
words would deviate from the conventional understanding of the statutory
language,” judges should follow this “conventional understanding” rather than the
“literal interpretation.”130
This is a strong theory; it covers more ground than Manning’s, authorizing
correction of all errors resulting in deviant texts and some non-deviant errors that
are patently absurd. But the theory is able to cover this large class of errors
because it is conceptually blunt: rather than drawing a line between unintended
consequences and unintended texts, the theory dictates correction of scrivener’s
errors only because they are a subclass of extreme absurdities. Like Manning,
therefore, Gold would not allow correction of texts which are facially non-absurd
but which the legislative history indicates are mistakenly worded; and unlike
Manning, Gold would allow limited use of the absurdity doctrine.
The theory’s faliure to distinguish between scrivener’s errors and the absurdity
doctrine may seem like reason enough to reject it. Recall that above I endorsed
Manning’s conclusion that the absurdity doctrine is inconsistent with the
conjunction of the faithful agent theory and the rejection of strong
intentionalism.131 But Gold’s approach to absurdity is unique; it purports to offer
fidelity-based reasons for endorsing the absurdity doctrine (and the correction of
scrivener’s errors) that are consistent with intent skepticism. It therefore merits a
close second look.
I have previously asserted that this type of theory is impossible: that fidelitybased reasons for error correction are inconsistent with intent-skepticism because
fidelity-based reasons for overriding a clear text necessarily assume the existence
of an intelligible notion of legislative intent lying behind the text. Gold attempts to
avoid this problem through the concept of constructive intent: a reasonable
interpreter can construct an intent for a text that runs contrary to the literal import
of the text, avoiding belief in any actual intent, and then remain faithful to this
constructed, non-literal intent. I will argue that Gold’s attempt ultimately fails.
Despite his best efforts, he ends up violating the faithful agent theory.
Take the Louisiana statute at issue in Scurto that allowed parties to impeach
witness testimony “in any unlawful way.”132 Gold, I presume, would be willing to
admit that the literal meaning of this text is that “parties can impeach witness
testimony in any unlawful way.” That is, this is the meaning expressed according
to the relevant semantic and syntactic conventions; call it A. Yet Gold would
instruct the judge to interpret the statute as expressing B: that “parties can impeach
witness testimony in any lawful way.” What reason does Gold have for asking
judges to ascribe B, rather than A, to the text?
Gold would argue that while the semantic and syntactic linguistic conventions

129.
130.
131.
132.

Gold, supra note 17, at 29.
Id.
See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text.
Scurto, 184 So. at 574.
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indicate that the statute is expressing A, there are higher-level linguistic
conventions that compel us to read it as expressing B, not A. For example, after
recognizing the distinction, familiar to modern philosophy of language,133 between
“speaker’s meaning” and “sentence meaning,”134 Gold discusses John Searle’s
argument that “the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence only has application
relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions,”135 and concludes that
these types of “[p]resumptions about the use of language can include questions of
gross injustice, at least at the margins.”136
The contribution of context to an utterance’s meaning is the subject of the field
of pragmatics, which leans heavily on the work of Grice, Searle, and John
Austin.137 And the idea that a text’s meaning can only be understood in context is
certainly uncontroversial among modern textualists.138 But it is also critical to the
survival of textualism as an independent theory of statutory interpretation, I think,
to follow Manning in differentiating between “semantic context” and “policy
context.”139 The textualist can properly interpret a statutory text in light of
contextual understandings of what is physically possible and how words are
ordinarily used. Textualists certainly would not want to say that the semantic
conventions memorialized in dictionaries and the syntactic conventions found in
Strunk and White exhaust the content of the linguistic conventions within a
linguistic community. Account must be taken of other conventions, such as the
higher order conventions that govern phenomena like indirect speech acts140 and
metaphor.141
But textualists must take care to distinguish these types of contextual cues
from the “policy context” of a statute.142 Including “questions of gross injustice”
within the semantic context143 squints towards Hart and Sacks’s presumption that
legislators are “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”144
Declining to apply Puffendorf’s celebrated statute that penalized anyone who

133. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS passim (1989); JOHN R. SEARLE,
EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS passim (1979).
134. See Gold, supra note 17, at 43–46.
135. SEARLE, supra note 133, at 117; another excellent—and perhaps more accessible—exploration
along these lines can be found in Donald Davidson, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs, in THE
ESSENTIAL DAVIDSON 251 (2006).
136. Gold, supra note 17, at 70–71.
137. See, generally, GRICE, supra note 133; SEARLE, supra note 133; JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969); J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH
WORDS (1962); SEMANTICS VERSUS PRAGMATICS (Zoltán Gendler Szabó ed., 2005).
138. See Manning, supra note 22, at 79–85; Scalia, supra note 11, at 37 (stating that “in textual
interpretation, context is everything.”).
139. See Manning, supra note 22, at 92–96.
140. See SEARLE, supra note 133, at 30–57.
141. Compare id. at 76–116, with ISRAEL SCHEFFLER, BEYOND THE LETTER: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY INTO AMBIGUITY, VAGUENESS AND METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE 79–130 (1979). It is not clear
how relevant the conventions governing metaphor are to the relatively prosaic texts of statutes, but
related phenomena, such as synecdoche and euphemism, are almost certainly relevant.
142. See Manning, supra note 22, at 92–96.
143. See Gold, supra note 17, at 70–71.
144. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).

142

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

“drew blood in the streets” to a surgeon attempting to save the life of someone
fallen in the street145 because “one might expect the term ‘drew blood’ to describe a
violent act”146 is a perfectly acceptable application of semantic context. But
refusing to apply the statute in this way because no one can reasonably be assumed
to have made that value choice is to follow one’s own views about the good and the
right instead of the policy views clearly expressed in the enacted text. To import
conventional policy considerations into the textualist enterprise of statutory
interpretation is to undermine the very foundation of textualism: deference to the
value choices of the legislature. Gold’s theory, it turns out, is not fidelity-based
after all; it contravenes the faithful agent theory in the same way that the more
conventional underpinnings of the absurdity doctrine do and must be rejected for
that reason.
3. Some Early Conclusions
In this section, I have surveyed—and ultimately rejected—two textualist
approaches to the problem of scrivener’s error. While the section has done
predominantly negative work, that work allows us to draw some positive
conclusions, which it will be helpful to review before moving on. I take the central
conclusions of this section to be twofold: first, fidelity-based reasons for correcting
scrivener’s errors are incompatible with intent-skeptical justifications for
textualism, and second, non-fidelity-based reasons for correcting scrivener’s errors
are either too weak to solve the problem or too strong to be counted as consistent
with the faithful agent theory. While not all non-fidelity-based reasons for error
correction lead to a violation of the faithful agent theory, we can now conclude,
after surveying both theories, that the non-fidelity based reasons that are
compatible with the faithful agent theory, such as imposing minimum conditions of
reasonableness on the legislature, are able to solve only a small subset of
scrivener’s errors, leaving correction of some of the most egregious and obvious
errors ungrounded. Non-fidelity-based reasons for error correction that are robust
enough to solve the entire set of errors end in asking judges to overrule the policy
judgments of the legislative text in favor of their own views of the good and the
right, and are for that reason inconsistent with the faithful agent theory, and hence
with textualism.
I conclude that an adequate textualist solution to the problem of scrivener’s
error is incompatible with intent skepticism. To the extent that a theory of statutory
interpretation that fails to adequately address the problem of scrivener’s error is for
that reason undesirable,147 it is incumbent on textualists to give non-intent-skeptical
justifications for their textualist methodology and show how those justifications
lead to an adequate solution to the scrivener’s error problem. It is to this task that I
now turn.

145. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868).
146. Manning, supra note 10, at 2461.
147. See supra Part III.A.
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IV. THE SCRIVENER’S ERROR DOCTRINE: A NEW CONCEPTUAL
GROUNDING
A. Textualism
The non-intent-skeptical justification for textualism that I find most
compelling takes off from the important jurisprudential work of Joseph Raz, Andrei
Marmor, and Jeremy Waldron. According to Raz’s “Normal Justification Thesis”:
The normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to
have authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is
likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged
authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, than if he tries to follow the
148
reasons which apply to him directly.

In turn, Marmor has noted:
[T]his normal justification thesis is in fact compound, consisting of two distinct
types of justification. In some cases, compliance with the authority’s directives
can only be justified on the basis of the assumption that the authority is likely to
have better access to the right reasons bearing on the issue than its alleged
subjects. . . . At other occasions, it is enough to show that the authority is better
situated than its alleged subjects to make the pertinent decision; that is, without
thus being committed to the presumption that there are certain reasons for action,
whose identification and ascertainment are more accessible to the persons in
149
authority.

The first case Marmor calls the “expertise branch” of the normal justification
thesis, while the latter category largely consists in the authority’s ability to solve
collective action problems. I will concentrate here on the first branch of the
justification thesis, for three reasons. First, I think it poses the harder case for
textualists, and that the arguments presented below are applicable to the collective
action branch in a fairly straightforward way.150 Second, I think much of the
collective action branch can also be cast in terms of epistemic deference: that is, the
subject defers to the value choices151 made by the authority because the authority
has better access to information of a certain kind than does the subject.152 Finally, I
148. Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295, 299 (1985).
149. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 134 (2005).
150. See id. at 132–39.
151. The term “value choice,” of course, more straightforwardly applies to choices subject to the
expertise branch than the collective action branch. Can the choice of which side of the road to drive on,
a classic coordination problem, really be described as a value choice? This quibble is to some extent
semantic; I will continue to use “value choice” to describe these types of cases because values are
certainly implicated and because the very act of deeming a choice authoritative, it strikes me, lends that
choice a normative valence.
152. For example, coordination problems, one of the largest categories in the collective action
branch, can straightforwardly be cast in terms of epistemic deference. The coordination problem for A
and B can be shown schematically as follows, where the possible outcomes are 1 and 2, with 1 the most
preferred and 2 the least preferred for each player:
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think that the expertise branch generally plays a larger role in justifying
legislation.153 For these reasons, I will describe obedience to authority in terms of
epistemic deference to authoritatively enacted value choices.
Jeremy Waldron has offered a justification of textualism based on the
argument that any reason we have for considering a statute adopted by a multimember lawmaking body as worthy of epistemic deference “is also a reason for
discounting the authority of the views or intentions of particular legislators
considered on their own.”154 Waldron considers three arguments for deferring to
such bodies. First, “The Utilitarian Argument”: from the utilitarian point of view,
if each legislator votes the interests of her constituents and the constituents are
proportionally represented in the legislature, then the resulting legislation will tend
to reflect the optimal satisfaction of individual interests.155 Second, “Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem”: according to this theorem, multi-member decision-making bodies
have a lower probability of error than an individual decider.156 Finally,
“Aristotelian Synthesis”: multi-member bodies have higher epistemic capabilities
than individuals because “a number of individuals may bring a diversity of
perspectives to bear on the complex issues under consideration, and . . . they are
capable of pooling these perspectives to come up with better decisions than any one
of them could make on his own.”157 But each of these justifications of group
authority also demonstrates that the capabilities of each member of the group are
significantly lower than the capabilities of the group as a whole.158
This alone is not enough to get us to textualism: the three arguments justify
according authority to whatever decisions are made by the group, and these
decisions, so far as we’ve gone, might just as well be expressed in an amorphous
intent as a canonical text. The crucial step in the argument is to insist that “[t]here
simply is no fact of the matter concerning a legislature’s intention apart from the

B
Do X
Do Y
A
Do X
1, 1
2, 2
Do Y
2, 2
1, 1
Here, clearly, the problem for A is simply that she doesn’t know which one B is going to pick, and the
same for B, mutatis mutandis. If an authority exists who A has reason to believe does know which B
will pick, and if the authority informs A that B will pick, say, X, then this constitutes a reason for A to
choose X; and analogously, again, for B. The fact that the authority knows that B will pick X because
the authority has made the choice of X salient through a system of sanctions doesn’t obscure the fact
that it is in part because of this knowledge on the part of the authority that it is advantageous for A (and
B) to defer to the authority. A similar interpretation might be possible for partially-competitive games
like the prisoner’s dilemma and the battle of the sexes. See the remarks on the role of communication in
these types of games in R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL SURVEY 110–11 (1957), and MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL
INTRODUCTION 77–82 (1970).
153. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 333 (1994) (arguing that “laws like the
prohibition of rape and murder” are hard to describe in terms of collective action problems).
154. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 138 (1999).
155. Id. at 133–34.
156. Id. at 134–36.
157. Id. at 137.
158. Id. at 138–42.
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formal specification of the act it has performed.”159 This act “is the text of the
statute as determined by the institution’s procedures. Those procedures make [the
legislators] one in action, and their identification of something as the text of a
statute makes [the legislators] one as the authors of a deed. Before that, however,
and beyond that, [the legislators] are many, and no further status as part of the
unum can be attributed to anything else that any of [them] says or thinks.”160
Despite the different flavor from the intent-skeptical arguments considered
earlier,161 then, Waldron’s textualism is intent-skeptical as well. Moreover, what
makes it skeptical is precisely what makes it textualist. In the remainder of this
section, I hope to sketch an argument for confining the interpretation of statutes to
their text that is similar to Waldron’s but that leaves room for a conception of
legislative intent that, although thin, is robust enough to support a fidelity-based
argument for correction of scrivener’s error.
The first step in my argument is also Waldron’s first step: showing that the
reasons we have for epistemically deferring to the legislature’s value choices only
apply to those choices that have survived appropriate procedural hurdles.162 I take
it that for reasons very much like the ones Waldron offers there are sound reasons
for epistemically deferring to the legislature; I will not repeat or expand on those
reasons here. But there are a number of procedural constraints that we impose on
legislators before we take their value choices as worthy of epistemic deference.
First, as Waldron emphasizes, we require them to act as a legislature, that is,
collectively and orderly. The only way for a body made up of diverse members
with diverse points of view to act as one in an orderly fashion is for them to adopt
certain procedures such as quorum requirements, rules of order and debate, and
voting rules.163 Relatedly, legislative choices are worthy of deference on epistemic
grounds only if the legislators had the opportunity to know what it was that they
were debating and voting on—if we defer to legislative value choices, it must be
because the legislators intended to choose them, and for them to have intended to
choose them, they must have been aware of what their choices were.164
This last, I think, is close to what Raz is getting at in his noted suggestion that
intentions must be relevant to statutory interpretation in at least a minimal way.165
“[T]o assume that the law made by legislation is not the one intended by the
legislator,” Raz writes, “we must assume that he cannot predict what law he is
making when the legislature passes any piece of legislation.”166 But if that is so, it
is hard to see why we care about who we elect as legislators, why we seek to make
159. Id. at 142.
160. Id. at 145.
161. Supra notes 26–40 and accompanying text.
162. Cf. WALDRON, supra note 154, at 138 (“[A]ny reason we have for according Raz-ian authority
to the resultant legislation is also a reason for discounting the authority of the views or intentions of
particular legislators considered on their own.”).
163. Id. at 73–77.
164. Of course, we might want courts and citizens to prescind from questioning in particular cases
whether legislators were voting with full knowledge, on second-order, rule-consequentialist grounds.
But this does not affect the first-order argument that value choices can be worthy of epistemic
deference, based on legislative competency, only if the choices were knowing and intentional.
165. See Raz, supra note 35, at 256–60, 262–68.
166. Id. at 258.
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them accountable to the electorate, or why we impose procedural requirements on
their legislative choices. So legislators, it seems, must have some minimum
amount of control over the content of the enacted law. However, this minimum
control is satisfied, Raz goes on to suggest, so long as legislators “know that they
are, if they carry the majority, making law, and they know how to find out what
law they are making” by establishing “the meaning of the text in front of them,
when understood as it will be according to their legal culture.”167
Second, we generally expect that if a legislature presents a value choice as
authoritative, more members supported the choice than opposed it: otherwise we
would have a reason to reject the value choice. But as Manning has emphasized,
we also want minorities to have their say; we want the legislature to adopt
procedures that will subject its proposed measures to fair and open debate and
disagreement, rather than procedures that allow the majority to ride roughshod over
the minority.168 Depending on our view of the role of government, we may even
want to require supermajorities at certain points in the process so as to slow the
pace of legislation.169 But whether or not we are able to agree on the desirability of
less legislation,170 we should be able to agree that we want to design procedures
that promote robust deliberation within the legislature. If we are epistemically
deferring to the legislature because it is a multi-member body, presumably one of
the advantages we hope to gain from such a body is the full airing-out of different
points of view. But, this is only possible if the legislature follows orderly
procedures designed to ensure open debate.171
Finally, and relatedly, if we want minorities to have a say and choices to be
subject to full and fair debate, we presumably want to allow compromise between
parties within the legislature who cannot come to a consensus. That is, we want to
allow legislators an option other than “vote for X” or “vote against X,” such as
“vote for X in return for Y,” or “vote for only 60% of X.” For this to be possible,
the legislature must follow procedures that allow amendments and allow the
legislature to choose between rules or standards172 and between different levels of
generality.173
All of these process considerations provide us with reasons to epistemically
defer to value choices that have emerged from legislatures of a particular kind, that
have adopted those choices after following particular processes. If a legislative
body fails to follow the right processes in enacting a given value choice, that choice
might be entirely unworthy of our epistemic deference, since it lacks the procedural
credentials that form the basis for this deference in the first place. For example, if
we learned that a statute was enacted by a group of legislators that constituted less
than the minimum quorum for business, or if we discovered that legislators were
167. Id. at 267.
168. See Manning, supra note 14, at 678–79; Manning, supra note 10, at 2437–38.
169. See Manning, supra note 14, at 708; THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 290 (James Madison) (Modern
Library ed., 2000) (“[T]he facility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the diseases to which
governments are most liable . . . .”).
170. Which, of course, may depend on the degree to which we are satisfied with the legal status quo.
171. See WALDRON, supra note 154, at 75–82.
172. See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 546–47.
173. See Manning, supra note 22, at 103–09.
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not allowed to know anything more than the title of the act when they voted for it,
we would presumably have very little reason to defer to that statute.
The second step in the argument is to note that we care about the prescriptive
content—that is, the discrete set of value choices—expressed by the laws that are
being imposed on us, not the form of words that is used. For example, if the
legislature passes a law that says “no vehicles in the park” and “vehicles” is
interpreted, based on legislative history, to include bicycles, the same prescriptive
content has been enforced as if the legislature had passed a law saying “no vehicles
in the park, and vehicles shall include bicycles for the purposes of this statute.”174
And since we care about the value choices that are enforced, it is those choices that
we want to pass through the procedural hurdles that constrain legislation. So if the
only dispositive reason to include bicycles as “vehicles” is a piece of legislative
history that expresses the opinion of only a minority of legislators, then the choice
to include bicycles as “vehicles” is not worthy of deference, since we have no
reason to believe that this choice actually survived the procedural hurdles.
The final step in the argument emphasizes that to reap the epistemic benefits of
the process considerations discussed above, at least two conditions must be met.
First, for a legislature’s set of value choices to be of any epistemic value, the set
must be consistent: it cannot command both P and ~P.175 This means the product
of the legislature’s deliberation must be unified, in a way.176 One way the
legislature might speak with one voice is by appointing a single member from its
body to speak for it, either as to all issues or as to a specific area of law. But by
delegating all legislative authority to one legislator, the legislature would
undermine the distinctive benefits of group lawmaking—we could achieve the
same result simply by electing a dictator outright and cutting out the middlemen.
The value choices of an elective dictator might be worthy of epistemic deference
under plausible conditions (Hobbes, at least, seems to have thought so177), but one
of our working premises has been that group deliberation and decision is
epistemically superior to a single individual’s deliberation and decision.
Delegating all decision making authority to a single member of the group loses
much of this superiority.
So the second requirement is that each individual legislature must be given the
opportunity to help define the contours of each value choice. Otherwise the unique
174. This well-worn example originated with Hart, to my knowledge. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
126 (2d ed. 1994).
175. However, it need not be coherent. That is, if a law contains value choices A, B and C, A cannot
entail ~B or ~C, etc. But there is no reason to insist (or, indeed, to expect), that A, B and C will “hang
together,” or follow from a single, coherent value theory, in the way that, for example, Dworkin’s theory
of Law as Integrity would require. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176–84, 219–24 (1986). I
do not say that such coherence would not be desirable, merely that such coherence is not required for a
set of value choices to perform any minimal sort of epistemic role, in the way that consistency is.
176. See WALDRON, supra note 154, at 144 (“[T]he form of legislation, as of all collective decisionmaking, is e pluribus unum.”); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 47, 66 (2006) (“[L]egal documents . . . only function well when they speak with one
voice, even if the process which generated that voice was messy and divisive.”).
177. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 80–84, 109–13 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Oxford 1955)
(1651).
OF LAW
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epistemic benefits of group deliberation and lawmaking are squandered. Focusing
legislative debate on the content of a text satisfies these twin conditions. Indeed,
it’s hard to see how else it would be possible for multiple legislators to agree
together on a specific set of value choices while preserving every individual
legislator’s ability to contribute to the shape and scope of each value choice. One
might say that the existence of a shared text enables a collective legislative intent to
form.
Now for a legislature to impose value choices on its citizens it must
communicate those choices to its citizens. That is, laws cannot constitute reasons
for action—citizens cannot epistemically defer to the value choices expressed by
those laws—unless there is a way for the citizens to ascertain the prescriptive
content expressed by those laws.178 And for reasons having to do with the special
properties of the written word,179 the textual medium is aptly suited to the task of
communicating the legislature’s value choices to the citizenry. The text performs
two critical roles in the creation and implementation of statutes, then: it makes it
possible for a multi-member legislature to bring their minds together and create a
unified intent, and it allows the legislature to communicate that intent to
subordinates, for implementation.
But this text must be interpreted, must be understood, in the normal way unless
there is a special reason to understand it in a different way. And the normal way of
178. See MARMOR, supra note 149, at 87–88 (“[O]nly an agent capable of communication with
others can have authority over them . . . .”); Raz, supra note 148, at 303 (“[I]t must be possible to
identify [an authoritative] directive as being issued by the alleged authority . . . .”); WALDRON, supra
note 154, at 99.
179. For example, a written text has a “fixation that enables it to be conserved.” PAUL RICOEUR,
What is a Text: Explanation and Understanding, in FROM TEXT TO ACTION 105, 106 (James M. Edie
ed., Kathleen Blamey & John B. Thompson trans., Nw. Univ. Press 1991) (1986); see also JACQUES
DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 36 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., John Hopkins University Press
1976) (1967); NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF
SHOW BUSINESS 21 (1985). This permanence allows the statute, embedded in written form, to outlive
the body that enacted it. Second, the written word has a certain protestant quality: copies of it can be
easily, cheaply, and widely distributed, allowing every court to enforce the value choices of the
legislature without direct, in-person instruction by the legislators. Moreover, this quality enables
citizens to know for themselves the content of their laws. Cf. NEIL POSTMAN, BUILDING A BRIDGE TO
THE 18TH CENTURY: HOW THE PAST CAN IMPROVE OUR FUTURE 188 (1999) (“When Gutenberg
announced that he could manufacture books . . . he did not imagine that his invention would undermine
the authority of the Catholic Church. And yet, less than eighty years later, Martin Luther was, in effect,
claiming that with the word of God available in every home, Christians did not require the papacy to
interpret it for them.”); NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY
65 (1992) (“[O]f course, printing vastly enhanced the importance of individuality.”); MARSHALL
MCLUHAN, The Print: How to Dig It, in UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 215, 218 (W. Terrence Gordon ed.,
Gingko Press 1997) (1964) (“Perhaps the supreme Quality of the print . . . is simply that it . . . can be
repeated precisely and indefinitely—at least as long as the printing surface lasts. . . . The message of the
print and of typography is primarily that of repeatability.”); Scalia, supra note 11, at 17 (describing “the
trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not
easily be read”). Third, because the written word endures and can be so easily disseminated, it promotes
openness and accountability in government. These and other qualities of the written word have been
explored by scholars in the field of media ecology, who study the ways in which the message which is
communicated is affected by the medium through which it is conveyed, see generally LANCE STRATE,
ECHOES AND REFLECTIONS: ON MEDIA ECOLOGY AS A FIELD OF STUDY (2006), and by such continental
philosophers as Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur.
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understanding a text can only be the way that an average reader, familiar with the
relevant conventions current in the relevant linguistic community, would
understand it. And a special reason for understanding the text in any way other
than the normal way must be a reason that has the same procedural bona fides as
the text itself, if it is to be worthy of deference. Understood in this way, textualism
is not a limitation on the ways in which Congress can use its words. Like Humpty
Dumpty, Congress can use its words to mean whatever it wants them to mean;180
textualists insist only that Congress go through the ordinary bundle of procedural
hurdles before it uses its words in ways that differ from their standard, conventional
meaning.181
B. Scrivener’s Error—Theory
In the last section I offered a normative justification for textualism. The
justification did not insist that a particular type of interpretive methodology is
conceptually necessary, or that it is, as a descriptive matter, the only type of
interpretation that is possible. Rather, the justification asserts that statutory
interpretation is a tool that is designed to play a particular role in the social
enterprise of law and authority, that this social enterprise fulfills certain ends or
purposes, such as the allocation of epistemic deference to those we deem to be in
the best position to make certain value choices, and that textualism is a desirable
account of statutory interpretation because it best allows the social practice of law
to fulfill these purposes.
But having just laid out the case against intentionalist interpretation, it may
seem hard to make out the textualist case for correcting scrivener’s errors. After
all, evidence that a particular statutory provision should read “lawful” instead of
“unlawful”182 is certainly a reason against the standard, conventional reading of the
text, and it is a reason that doesn’t seem to have passed through the ordinary bundle
of procedural constraints. Isn’t such a reading barred by the case I just finished
making? Indeed, isn’t the theory of textualism just offered thoroughly intentskeptical?
Before suggesting an answer to these questions it might be worthwhile to
pause and reflect on the conditions we should expect the answer to satisfy—the
criteria of adequacy of any textualist solution to the problem of scrivener’s error, if
you will. These conditions can usefully be placed into two broad categories:
conditions the theory must meet if it is to be “textualist,” and conditions it must
meet if it is to adequately solve the problem of scrivener’s error. We should
already have a fairly clear idea of what the conditions in the first category look like.
Our earlier discussion of textualism has revealed that for the proposed theory to be
textualist, it must be consistent with the faithful agent theory.183 Further, the theory

180. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 164 (Lothrop Publ’g Co. 1898)
(1865); see also Spence, supra note 106, at 585–89.
181. No textualist would assert, for example, that Congress cannot make “green” mean “red” if it
wants to, by including a definitions section that says “‘green’ shall refer to the color ordinarily called
‘red,’ for the purposes of this statute.”
182. See Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938).
183. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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should be consistent with the rejection of the ordinary use of legislative history.184
As to the second category, for a proposed solution to adequately solve the problem
of scrivener’s error it must do two things. First, it must explain why a textual
segment that is the result of a scrivener’s error should not be followed. Second, the
argument must show why the error should not only be ignored but should be
corrected: why the courts should enforce as part of the statute a command that is
not, strictly speaking, contained in its text.
The sense in which the justification for textualism just sketched is not intentskeptical—and the key to an adequate textualist solution to the problem of
scrivener’s error—can be seen, I want to suggest, in the familiar distinction
between the legislature’s intent to enact certain words and its intent that those
words be interpreted in a certain way.185 Any theory of statutory interpretation
applies to only a tiny subset of existing texts. In the case of the theory outlined
above, there is no reason to epistemically defer to the value choices expressed by
the conventional meaning of the texts found in the Harvard Law Review, or the
New York Times, or the Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe. A theory
of statutory interpretation relies, that is, on a set of criteria that identifies certain
textual segments to which it applies. Using the criteria to pick out these textual
segments is a prior step to applying the theory’s interpretive methodology.
According to the textualist theory advocated here, legislative intent, while properly
ignored at the stage of interpreting statutes for the reasons discussed in the previous
section, is crucial to identifying which texts should count as statutes in the first
place.
Before we can even identify a text as a statute, we have to identify a set of
markings as a text. That is, before we can apply our criteria of statutory identity,
we need to apply criteria of textual identity. Steven Knapp and Walter Benn
Michaels famously argued, in a series of articles, that authorial intent must form a
part of this set of criteria for determining textual identity.186 Briefly examining
184. See supra Part IV.A.
185. See Fried, supra note 17, at 591 (discussing “the distinction between the intent of a legislature
with respect to the words it meant to enact and its intent with respect to the consequences of those
words”). The first type of intent is merely the intent to enact certain words into law, and is therefore
less expansive than Dworkin’s “semantic intention,” which includes “what Congress . . . intended to say
in speaking as it did.” Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at
115, 117. The second category of intentions is similar in content to Marmor’s panoply of aims, further
intentions, and application intentions. MARMOR, supra note 149, at 165–72. Another exploration along
these lines which I have found very helpful is Michael Hancher, Three Kinds of Intention, 87 MOD.
LANGUAGE NOTES 827 (1972).
186. See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY
STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 11 (W. J. T. Mitchell ed., 1985) [hereinafter Knapp & Michaels,
Against Theory]; Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Our Critics, in AGAINST THEORY:
LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 95 (W. J. T. Mitchell ed., 1985); Steven Knapp &
Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Richard Rorty: What is Pragmatism, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY
STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 139 (W. J. T. Mitchell ed., 1985); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn
Michaels, Against Theory 2, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49 (1987) [hereinafter Knapp & Michaels, Against
Theory 2]. Knapp and Michaels’ argument, and the central example on which it largely rests, can be
traced back to the slightly earlier work of another literary theorist, P.D. Juhl. See P.D. JUHL,
INTERPRETATION: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY CRITICISM 71–76 (1980). The line of
argument is also frequently associated with Stanley Fish. See STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain
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their argument will help to illustrate the distinction between the intention to utter a
text and the intention to mean something by that utterance.
The central thrust of Knapp and Michaels’ argument is centered around the
following example: imagine that you come across the first stanza to Wordsworth’s
poem A Slumber Did my Spirit Seal carved out in the sand, along the beach. As
you gaze at the marks in the sand, a wave washes over the words, and as it recedes,
you are amazed to see that the second stanza of the poem is now etched in the
sand.187 According to Knapp and Michaels, unless you posit some unconventional
author—such as the ghost of Wordsworth, or a team of scientists, perhaps testing
some water-activated chemical—you must recognize at this point that the marks in
the sand are not words but “merely seem to resemble words.”188 “As long as you
thought the marks were poetry, you were assuming their intentional character. . . .
But to deprive them of an author is to convert them into accidental likenesses of
language. They are not, after all, an example of intentionless meaning; as soon as
they become intentionless they become meaningless as well.”189
Now, as David Couzens Hoy points out, assigning meaning to marks we know
were produced unintentionally doesn’t seem to be strictly impossible,190 but it does
seem to be very far from what we mean by the concept of interpretation. Knapp
and Michaels, in a later article, point to the difference between interpreting a text
and writing a new one: to claim that she is producing an interpretation of a text
rather than a different text, an interpreter needs “a criterion of textual identity that
will allow the text to remain the same while its meaning changes.”191 In yet
another article, they produce a reductio ad absurdum to show that author’s
intention is the only possible such criterion:
[I]f we agree that some marks produced by chance are meaningful, do we want to
claim that all marks produced by chance are meaningful? Presumably not.
Presumably the only marks that have meaning are the ones that look like the marks
humans make when they are using marks to mean something. . . . But what about
marks that don’t look like words in any known language, but that will look like
words in some language when that language (say, five hundred years from now)
Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC,
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 87, 98–100 (1989). The line of
argument has also found its way into the legal literature. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18.
Although Alexander and Prakash do not cite Knapp and Michaels, their intellectual (as well as stylistic!)
debt to the authors of Against Theory is obvious. Long before Alexander and Prakash wrote, however,
the argument had been imported into the debate over legal interpretation by Knapp, Michaels, and Fish
themselves. See, e.g., Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Constitution:
A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 187, 187
(Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) [hereinafter Knapp & Michaels, Response to Hoy]; Stanley Fish, Play of
Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 297, 297
(Gregory Leyh ed., 1992); Walter Benn Michaels, The Fate of the Constitution, 61 TEX. L. REV. 765
(1982).
187. See Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory, supra note 186, at 15–16.
188. Id. at 16.
189. Id.
190. David Couzens Hoy, Intentions and the Law: Defending Hermeneutics, in LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS, supra note186, at 173, 177; see also Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Word Meaning in
Legal Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465, 474–77 (2005).
191. Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2, supra note 186, at 53.
AND THE
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has evolved? . . . To think that some marks produced by chance are texts is thus
apparently to commit oneself to the view that all marks produced by chance,
whether they were texts once or are texts now, will eventually be texts, and will be
192
texts in an infinite number of languages.

I think this argument is fairly strong, but from here Knapp and Michaels make an
important but, I think, unwarranted leap. While their argument may show that
intention forms a necessary part of any criteria-set of textual identity, this tells us
nothing about the possible criteria of textual meaning.193 Knapp and Michaels
generally confuse these two throughout their discussion in these later articles, but,
as I have argued above, they seem entirely separable. It may be true that we can
only consider a text to be a text if it was intended as such by someone, but it takes
an additional argument to show that in interpreting the meaning of that text we
must confine ourselves to the meaning that the author intended it to have.
Above, I have argued that intention simply doesn’t have this kind of relevance
to the question of meaning, at least in the case of statutory interpretation. But
before one can apply this argument, one additional step is needed: we not only need
to identify a series of marks as a text, but we need to identify a text as a statute,
valid in our jurisdiction; and for this second step, intention also turns out to be
highly relevant. From the perspective of the justification for textualism offered
above, it shouldn’t be hard to see why: the ordinary reasons for epistemically
deferring to the legislature’s textually embedded value choices simply don’t apply
to textual segments that the legislature never intended to enact.
The solution I have been sketching satisfies, then, the first condition that a
proposed theory must meet if it is to adequately solve the scrivener’s-error
problem: it justifies disregarding a duly-passed textual segment that is the result of
a scrivener’s error, despite textualism’s standard interpretive methodology. My
claim has been that the criteria of textual and statutory identity that underlie
textualism demand that unintended textual segments deserve no epistemic
deference and hence do not even count as part of the statutory cannon, the object to
which textualism’s standard methodology is applied. To see the case for correcting
errors—the second condition—we need to recall that the text performs two critical
roles in the process of making legislation. First, it makes it possible for a body of
legislators, each with his or her own values, commitments, and projects, to come
together as one and agree on a unified set of value choices. Voting serially to
embed certain discrete choices in a text allows consensus to form around
undisputed points and enables negotiations, compromises, and trade-offs in areas of
disagreement. Second, once the text has enabled a single harmony to emerge from
the cacophony, it is ordinarily the exclusive means of communicating this resultant,
harmonious set of choices to others.
192. Knapp & Michaels, Response to Hoy, supra note 186, at 190–91.
193. For an argument along similar lines, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV 1, 47–49 (2009) (“We could agree that the intention of an agent to convey meaning is necessary for
the text thereby produced to bear meaning . . . without agreeing that the meaning that the text thereby
bears must be the meaning that its author intended.”). See also Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 190, at
473–74 (“One intention is the intention to mean something as opposed to nothing, that is, to say
something meaningful. Another intention is the intention to mean something in particular as opposed to
something else.”).
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Even statutory texts that contain scrivener’s errors have successfully
performed the first function. A statute that includes a clause permitting the
“unlawful” impeachment of witnesses, where there is conclusive evidence that a
passing majority of legislators intended the clause to read “lawful” rather than
“unlawful,” has successfully allowed the legislature to unite around a course of
action that contains the permission of lawful witness impeachment. This value
choice is worthy of our deference, on the theory of authority sketched earlier, since
it surmounted all of the procedural hurdles that we required. Even erroneous
textual segments succeed in performing the first function of statutory texts, then,
but they are less than fully successful in performing the second function. Because
the wording is erroneous, they communicate the wrong value choices to
government officials further along in the chain of authorities who carry out the law.
However, the error in wording need not be a complete bar to communication—and
therefore implementation—of the law. Where the choice the legislature took itself
to be making and passing along is obvious, a mere mistake in wording should not
prevent other officials and citizens from following the value choices that emerged
from the proper process and can be understood, despite the mistake.
The case for textualism, I have argued, is bottomed on a conception of
authority that counsels epistemic deference to the value choices embedded in a
legislatively enacted text. From this, we can meet the two conditions that any
approach to scrivener’s error must meet in order to justify the correction of such
errors. First, if we have near-conclusive evidence that an otherwise valid statute
contains a scrivener’s error and for that reason contains a textual segment that the
legislature in fact did not intend to enact, there is no reason for us to defer to the
value choices embedded in that piece of unintentional legislation.194 Put
differently, intention forms a necessary part of the criteria used to identify valid
statutes, just like the criteria used to identify texts. Believing that a text has been
intentionally passed by the legislature is a precondition to treating it as a valid
statute in the first place, on the theory of authority we have been assuming.195
194. See Recent Case, supra note 18, at 2120 (“When the actual words of a statute conflict with the
joint legislative and executive understanding of its meaning, enforcing the literal words frustrates the
very purposes of bicameralism and presentment.”).
195. This accords with Raz’s conclusion that “the interpretation of statutes, etc., in accord with
authors’ intentions is a universal feature of legal systems which recognize legislation as a source of law,
for it is implied by the very notion of legislation.” Raz, supra note 35, at 280. Interestingly, Raz seems
to suggest at one point that his requirement of minimal intention has no implications for cases of
scrivener’s error. He writes:
Given that normally legislation is institutionalized in a way which virtually removes the
risk of a slip of the tongue, loss of physical control, and other explanations of misfired
action, and given that any conceivable theory of authority puts a high premium on
relative clarity in demarcating what counts as an exercise of authority and what does not,
the possibility of having to go behind what is said to establish what was meant becomes
very rare. For practical purposes it may altogether disappear.
Id. at 270. The examples of scrivener’s errors given throughout this article may be sufficient to suggest
that the phenomenon is not as rare as Raz might think. Moreover, it is hard to see how Raz’s argument
that legislators must have some minimal intentional control over the content of law in order to satisfy
any realistic theory of authority can be squared with treating known scrivener’s errors as binding. No
legislator chooses to make a mistake, and no legislature can choose not to, or choose what the content of
that mistake will be. See Recent Case, supra note 18, at 2120 (“Scriveners’ errors occur frequently and
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Second, if there is near-conclusive evidence that a particular, concrete value
choice did in fact survive the procedural hurdles and that the legislative majority
that passed the statute did in fact take itself to be embedding that choice in the text
it enacted, the reasons that generally counsel deference to the outcomes of the
legislative process also counsel deference to these value choices, despite the fact
that they were not communicated in the ordinarily exclusive way, through the
conventional meaning of the enacted text. Despite the error, the text has enabled a
unified intent to emerge from the legislature and has succeeded in enabling later
legal actors to divine this intent.
An example may help to make these rather abstract considerations more
concrete and easier to grasp. Take the clerical error in 28 U.S.C. § 1453, which
caused some headaches in the circuit courts, until Congress corrected the error in
2009. Section 1453 deals with the removal to federal court of class action lawsuits;
(c)(1) provided that “a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a
district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State
court from which it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not
less than 7 days after entry of the order.”196 Read literally, the provision allowed
parties to appeal an order disposing of a motion to remand only if they applied for
the appeal after seven days had passed since the order was entered, a fairly absurd
requirement. Beginning in 2005, a series of circuit courts confronted the peculiar
text, with each court holding that the error ought to be corrected to read “not more
than 7 days,” since “no logical purpose [is] attained by requiring a party to wait
seven days before seeking to appeal an order granting or denying a motion to
remand, and then allowing that party to seek appellate review at any time in the
future after the period has passed.”197 Moreover, “the uncontested legislative intent
behind § 1453(c) was to impose a seven-day deadline for appeals.”198 In 2009,
Congress corrected the error and simultaneously expanded the window for
application for review to 10 days.199
According to the theory I am defending, the courts properly corrected the
error. Assuming that that the evidence of error was as conclusive as the courts
thought, no real choice to enact a text requiring a waiting period of seven days ever
cleared the hurdles of the lawmaking process, so such a choice deserved no more
are the unintentional mistakes of the Congress’s clerical staff—no degree of legislative responsibility
can either anticipate or eradicate them.”). So long as mistakes happen and can be identified as such,
interpreting them as valid enactments would seem to deprive the legislature of the minimum necessary
control over the content of these provisions of the law. Raz’s emphasis on “clarity in demarcating what
counts as an exercise of authority and what does not” is well taken, however; throughout this discussion,
I have been assuming that scrivener’s errors can be clearly identified. I discuss some of the practical
implications of the importance of clarity below, see infra notes 247–255 and accompanying text. The
point is highly relevant for the development of practical scrivener’s error doctrine, but given that at least
some scrivener’s errors do exist and can be clearly identified, I am not sure how relevant the question of
clarity is to the conceptual questions underlying that doctrine, discussed in this section.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
197. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146
(9th Cir. 2006).
198. Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 2006). Accord Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d
25, 27–28 (2d Cir. 2008); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v.
Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
199. Act of May 7, 2009 U.S.C.A.N. (123 Stat.) 1607, 1608 (2009).
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deference than if the clerk taking the freshly-passed text to be published had been
waylaid by lobbyists opposed to the bill who had surreptitiously substituted the
word “less” for “more.” On the other hand, the choice to enact a text embedding a
7 day limitation period was supported by a legislative majority that had survived
the requisite procedural constraints: this choice was the very choice that the
legislature had taken itself to be enacting, according to the conclusive (we’re
assuming) evidence. An obvious error in communicating this choice should not be
taken as affecting the deference-worthiness of the choice itself.
The proposed solution thus justifies both disregarding a statutory provision
that was unintentionally enacted and enforcing as part of the statute the provision
that the legislature intended to enact. It is therefore an adequate solution to the
problem of scrivener’s error. I submit that this approach to scrivener’s error also
meets the two conditions that any such theory must meet in order to be textualist: it
justifies correction of scrivener’s errors while adhering to the faithful agent theory
and remaining consistent with a principled rejection of both the ordinary use of
legislative history and purposivism. It plainly falls within the confines of the
faithful agent theory, since the reasons for error correction are fidelity-based. The
value choices of Congress, the theory holds, deserve the epistemic deference of its
faithful agents in the judiciary, and those agents ought to prescind from their own
all-things-considered judgments as to the wisdom, desirability, or goodness of
those choices, even when it is hard to see what values are furthered by application
of a seemingly over or under-inclusive rule. The theory only demands that to be
deference-worthy, these choices need to be embedded in a text that Congress took
itself to be enacting into law. The justification offered by the theory for correcting
scrivener’s errors, then, is strictly fidelity-based, and therefore falls within the
faithful agent theory, where textualism has long found its home.
The theory also rejects the ordinary use of legislative history, although not on
intent-skeptical grounds, since it relies on a non-intent-skeptical justification for
textualism itself. Judges ought to decline to give potentially dispositive weight to
materials such as sponsor’s statements and committee reports because those
materials have not survived the crucible of procedural constraints through which
we demand any legislative value choice to pass before according it epistemic
deference. Those value choices that do clear these procedural hurdles, moreover,
can ordinarily only be communicated through the enacted text. Judges ought to
ignore the choices expressed by the conventional meaning of the purported
legislative text only in the very rare case where there is near-conclusive evidence
that the text itself does not meet, in certain respects, the fundamental criteria we
must use in identifying some texts as valid statutes in the first place—criteria that
include the requirement that the text be intentionally passed.200
Finally, this approach to scrivener’s error is equipped to deal with errors that
do not result in a deviant text, as well as those that do, as the above discussion of
200. Since it adheres to the faithful agent theory and is consistent with the rejection of the ordinary
use of legislative history, the theory is also consistent with Manning’s reasons for rejecting the absurdity
doctrine. Although I have not emphasized the distinction between textualism and purposivism in this
article, the proposed theory is also consistent with the rejection of purposivism, since it requires an
interpreter to respect the legislature’s choice to express its value choices at a certain level of generality.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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28 U.S.C. § 1453 demonstrates. It is for that reason more desirable, ceteris
paribus, than the theories we examined in Part III, none of which was capable of
justifying the correction of the entire class of scrivener’s errors.
C. Scrivener’s Error—Practice
Up to now, I have been tacitly assuming away an issue that, we can now see, is
tremendously important: I have assumed that the evidence for believing there is an
error in the text is “near-conclusive.” But I have said little or nothing about what
kind of evidence, or how much of it, judges ought to demand before finding a text
to contain a scrivener’s error. We can see at once that how we answer these
questions determines to a great degree the usefulness and desirability of the theory.
If the evidentiary requirements of the theory are quite low and condone the
correction of alleged errors whenever an argument for correction passes the laugh
test, the suggested approach to scrivener’s error would be fidelity-based in name
only, surreptitiously undermining the epistemic justification of textualism.
On the other hand, if the evidentiary requirements were quite strict, allowing
correction of only the most obvious and egregious errors, the theory would be
undesirable for the very reasons we rejected the existing approaches to scrivener’s
error: it would fail to justify correction of the entire class of errors in fact, if not in
theory. In this final section I address these evidentiary concerns, describing the
types of evidence I would admit and the level of evidence I would require and
articulating the ways in which the proposed theory would differ in practice from
the approach to scrivener’s error that is current among textualist judges.
The errors that most easily satisfy any plausible evidentiary requirement are
those that result in deviant texts. If the provision at hand is missing a verb, like 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) & (G), discussed earlier,201 there is no question that there
has been a “drafting snafu.”202 Or, to take a fresh example, a 1909 Nevada law
regulated the primary system for state elections.203 In 1911, the Nevada legislature
amended Section 2 of the act but left out a crucial comma: § 2, as amended,
provided, inter alia, that “[t]his act shall not apply to special elections to fill
vacancies to the nomination of party candidates for presidential electors, nor to the
nomination of officers of the incorporated cities, whose charters or ordinances now
or may hereafter provide a system of nominating candidates for such offices, nor to
the nomination of officers for reclamation and irrigation districts.”204
As the Nevada Supreme Court noted, the final version of the bill was
apparently missing a comma after “vacancies.”205 To exempt both “special
elections to fill vacancies” and “the nomination of presidential electors” from the
scope of the law makes at least linguistic sense, but the court was at a loss to divine
what “a special election to fill vacancies to the nominations” could conceivably
be.206 In the case of deviant texts like this one, no evidence of scrivener’s error is
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
United States v. Banda-Zamora, 178 F.3d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1999)
Act of March 23, 1909, ch. 198, 1909 Nev. Stat. 273.
Act of March 23, 1911, ch. 165 sec. 1, § 2, 1911 Nev. Stat. 334.
State ex rel. Allen v. Brodigan, 125 P. 699, 700–02 (Nev. 1912).
Id. at 701.
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needed beyond the face of the text itself; it takes no argument to show that
“colorless green ideas” cannot “sleep furiously,”207 that a meaningless statutory
provision cannot conceivably “reflect[] a deliberate legislative compromise.”208
The evidentiary question is much more difficult for most non-deviant errors.
A first question, which we’ve skirted several times but have not yet directly
addressed, is whether the textualist can properly consider legislative history in
determining whether or not she is faced with an error. Because legislative history
is so closely associated with the intentionalist style of interpretation that textualists
take as their target,209 and because the abuses of legislative history have been so
notorious,210 textualists are justifiably suspicious of any and all uses of legislative
history.211 But I want to suggest that occasionally legislative history can properly
be used to support a claim of scrivener’s error.
Recall from above212 that 49 U.S.C. § 14704 addressed two types of violations
by interstate carriers: actions that violated certain regulations, in subsection (a), and
certain illegal overcharges, in subsection (b).213 Section 14705, in turn, created
limitation periods, with (b) limiting administrative complaints regarding general
overcharges to 3 years,214 and (c) providing a two-year limitation for complaints
“under section 14704(b).”215 But the reference to § 14704(b) was odd, since that
subsection also dealt with overcharges, albeit a limited class of them, while actions
under § 14704(a)(2) went unaddressed by the limitations section of the statute. We
discovered above that the legislative history of the provision provided a very
plausible explanation for this peculiarity: in the original language of both the House
and Senate bills, (a)(2) had been numbered (b)(2) and accordingly would have been
subject to § 14705(c).216 One of a series of last minute amendments had changed
the numbering of this provision in the version that ended up being adopted by the
conference committee, and then by both houses, even though “in the Conference
Report Congress specifically stated that it intended to preserve the relevant statute
of limitations, which was two years under the former Interstate Commerce Act.”217
Moreover, “Congress specifically stated that it intended to make the limitations
period uniform for all types of carriers,” and the “statute of limitations for the
parallel provisions governing rail and pipeline carriers is two years.”218 Here, the
legislative history provides a crucial evidential link on the way to discovering error:
standing alone, the fact that the statute leaves the (a)(2) claims to be governed by
the default four-year statute of limitations is odd, but hardly so absurd that it could
207. CHOMSKY, supra note 53, at 15.
208. Manning, supra note 10, at 2459 n.265.
209. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 62-65.
210. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 29–37; Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative
History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1012–23 (1992).
211. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 29–37; Easterbrook, supra note 25. But see Manning, supra note
14, at 731–37 (discussing limited uses of legislative history that could be accepted by textualists).
212. Supra notes 80–94 and accompanying text.
213. 49 U.S.C. § 14704 (2006).
214. Id. § 14705(b).
215. Id. § 14705(c).
216. Fitzpatrick v. Morgan S., Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
217. Id.
218. Id.

158

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

not have been intended. But the drafting history of the provision suggests that this
result was, in fact not intended and thus provides us with near-conclusive proof that
the reference to (b) is a scrivener’s error.
Importantly, the drafting history in this case has two features that justify our
reliance. First, the evidence goes to show that the text that was ultimately passed
was not the text the legislature took itself to be passing. But for the last minute
renumbering, (a)(2) would have been numbered as (b)(2)—the textual content the
legislature plausibly thought it was passing. This relates to the distinction between
intended wording and intended meaning discussed earlier: any evidence that
legislators thought § 14705 should be interpreted to cover § 14704(a)(2) would, on
its own, be evidence of intentions that had not passed the bundle of procedural
hurdles we require choices to clear before they become law. Interpreting based on
this evidence would be barred by the process-based argument for textualism. But
the evidence here goes to show something more fundamental: that the textual
reference to 14704(b) was unintended, and as such, does not pass the criteria of
identity we use to identify certain texts as valid statutes in the first place.
Second, most of the legislative history here is of a kind that is relatively free
from manipulation. Textualists have developed a sensitivity to the risk that
legislative history is disingenuous.219 With sponsor’s statements and committee
reports, it is all too easy for individual legislators to insert whatever they want into
the legislative record in the hopes of influencing interpreters further down the
pipe—indeed, it is fear of this kind of behavior that underlies much of the
textualist’s insistence that any reason for a non-conventional interpretation must
itself have cleared all of the relevant procedural hurdles. Knowledge by legislators
that judges are willing to consult legislative history, even if just to find scrivener’s
errors, might produce strategic behavior on their part: legislators might seek a way
to plant the legislative record with false suggestion that a scrivener’s error has
occurred. 220
To the extent that consulting legislative history—even for these limited
purposes—creates these risks, textualists are right to be suspicious. But most of the
legislative history in this case consists of the history of the bill’s organization and
the various structural incarnations it went through as it made its way to becoming
law. Even where the argument from legislative history relies on committee reports
or statements by individual legislators, it does so only to provide additional
evidence for an inference that is drawn from the structural history of the bill.
Legislative history of this kind—evidence of the prior organization and numbering
of provisions—is uniquely, even if not completely, resistant to manipulation and,
when backed up by evidence drawn from less reliable sources, can form the basis
of a powerful inference that an error in draftsmanship has occurred.221
So legislative history may occasionally provide very persuasive evidence that
there has been a drafting error. Another source courts often look to in determining
whether there has been an error is the absurdity of the literal reading of the statute.
219. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 11, at 29–37; Note, supra note 210, at 1012–23.
220. I am grateful to Professor Manning for pressing me on this point.
221. See Recent Case, supra note 18, at 2121 (“[L]egislative history is likely to provide a coherent,
reliable and judicially administrable means of identifying linguistic errors. . . . It is likely to be reliable,
because the capacity to manipulate information about drafting errors is severely limited.”).
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This too can be an important source of probative evidence that a statutory text
contains a clerical error. Consider the Kentucky statute at issue in Bird v. Board of
Commissioners.222 There, the Kentucky legislature had imposed a tax for the
construction of turnpikes, “provided that the width of the macadam223 shall not be
less than eight inches nor more than fifteen inches.”224 So the tax could only be
used to finance roads that were less than fifteen inches wide! Here, the absurdity of
the statute as written is almost dictated by the laws of physics: unless the legislature
is to be understood as financing turnpikes for toy cars, the wording must be
erroneous. Indeed, the evidence of error here is nearly as strong as in the case of
the deviant texts discussed above.
Harder cases arise when the error results in texts that strike us as clearly
erroneous because of our policy intuitions, rather than because of the necessary
nature of things like turnpikes and automobiles. Recall the statute in Scurto v.
LeBlanc, which we’ve trotted out so many times, that allowed impeachment of
testimony “in any unlawful way.”225 Here, the intuition seems so strong that the
Louisiana legislature just couldn’t have intended to allow “unlawful” impeachment
that no additional evidence seems necessary to conclude that we must be faced with
a drafting error. Indeed, it’s hard to know what it could even mean to lawfully
provide for the unlawful impeachment of testimony: isn’t the statute selfdefeating?226
Contrast Scurto with the famous case of United States v. Locke.227 There, the
Court dealt with the annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976. That act requires the owners of certain classes of
mining claims to file certain documents each year “prior to December 31.”228 One
would have expected the statute to require filing of the documents “on or before
December 31.” The statute as worded creates the odd result that someone who files
on the last day of the year has filed too late and is in violation of the Act. The
appellees in Locke, who were in exactly this position, argued that the statutory
language was a scrivener’s error; that Congress had meant to set the deadline at the
end of the year, rather than one day before.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected the appellees’ argument, on
the grounds that “[t]o attempt to decide whether some date other than the one set
out in the statute is the date actually ‘intended’ by Congress is to set sail on an
aimless journey, for the purpose of a filing deadline would be just as well served by
nearly any date a court might choose as by the date Congress has in fact set out in
the statute.”229 But of course this argument is a bit disingenuous: a deadline of on
222. 24 S.W. 118 (Ky. 1893).
223. Macadam is defined as “[b]roken stone for spreading upon a road way; the road way so made.”
WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1016
(Harold Whitehall ed., 1952).
224. Bird, 24 S.W. at 118.
225. Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938).
226. By providing by law for the unlawful impeachment of testimony, the statute seems to be making
lawful all types of impeachment that had heretofore been unlawful. This seems to mean that “unlawful
impeachment of testimony” now describes an empty set.
227. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
228. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (2006).
229. Locke, 471 U.S. at 93.
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or before December 31 is hardly an “arbitrary one.” December 31 is the end of the
calendar year and hence a natural point at which to set a deadline. Indeed, as
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, “no one has suggested any rational basis
for omitting just one day from the period in which an annual filing may be made,”
and setting the deadline at this point in fact feels a little like “a trap for the
unwary.”230
Marshall’s argument that “the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions
that require action ‘prior to’ some date, including at least 14 provisions that
contemplate action ‘prior to December 31,’”231 fares better, I think. Stevens
attempts to parry the thrust by showing that “[e]leven of the provisions refer to a
one-time specific date” and that “each of the specific dates mentioned in the 11
provisions is long past; thus, contrary to the Court’s premise, this decision would
have no effect on them because they require no future action.”232 But this response
cuts little ice against Marshall’s basic point that the deadline of one day before the
end of the year is not unique to this statute, which significantly dampens the
plausibility that it was an isolated scrivener’s error. If the formulation has been
used 14 different times, it seems far more likely that it is intentional and reflects
some hidden goal or compromise. Without more evidence of error, the deadline is
odd, I think, but the implausibility that it reflects some hidden legislative goal does
not rise to the level needed to correct it as a scrivener’s error. Providing for
unlawful impeachment of testimony is so absurd, as a policy matter, as to make it
extremely unlikely that such a turn of phrase was intentional. Providing for a
deadline of one day before the end of the year is certainly odd but not quite
unthinkable in the same way.
At this point, I might seem subject to a charge of inconsistency. Earlier, I
rejected recourse to the “policy context” of a statute as inconsistent with the
faithful agent theory.233 But haven’t I just now endorsed the use of the selfsame
policy considerations as a valid source of evidence for rooting out scrivener’s
errors?
The seeming inconsistency vanishes once we recall the distinction between the
conceptual reasons for correcting clerical errors and the evidentiary reasons for
suspecting that we are faced with such an error.234 Above, I criticized Gold
because he relied on the policy intuitions of the average reader to ground his
conceptual justification for correcting errors and absurdities: that higher-order
conventions allowed judges to simply gloss over the literal meaning of a text when
that meaning grossly violated widespread intuitions about justice.235 I criticized
this theoretical account for impermissibly relying on the interpreter’s policy
judgments in preference to the policy judgments that the legislature clearly
embedded in the statutory text; this substitution of the interpreter’s value choices
for those of the legislature’s, I argued, is incompatible with the commitment to
legislative supremacy that bottoms the theory of textualism, properly understood.
230.
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Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 96 n.12.
Id. at 125 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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But my theoretical account of scrivener’s error is quite different; it is fidelity
based, crucially relying on an understanding of deference to legislatively selected
values to justify the correction of texts that inadequately express those value
selections. Relying on the profound policy absurdity of certain texts as an
evidentiary matter to help us know when we are dealing with a clerical error does
nothing to change the fact that once we have determined, based on the evidence,
that we are faced with such an error, we are justified in correcting that error,
according to my theory, for reasons sounding in legislative supremacy rather than
our own intuitions about the good and the right.
There is no reason, then, to ignore such policy considerations when trying to
determine if we are up against a clerical error. At the other extreme, many
textualist judges refuse to look at other evidence of error until they have
determined that the text of the statute is absurd or indeterminate.236 For example,
in Holloway v. United States,237 the Court dealt with the intent requirement in the
federal carjacking statute.238 The provision in question provides certain federal
criminal penalties for “[w]hoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
harm takes a motor vehicle” connected with interstate or foreign commerce.239 The
question at issue in Holloway was whether the intent mentioned in the statute
required proof “that the defendant had an unconditional intent to kill or harm in all
events,” or if the requirement was satisfied by “conditional intent,” that is, intent to
cause death or bodily harm should certain events take place, for example, should
the owner of the car resist the theft.240
The Court held that conditional intent sufficed; Scalia dissented, on the
grounds that “in customary English usage the unqualified word ‘intent’ does not
usually connote a purpose that is subject to any conditions precedent except those
so remote in the speaker’s estimation as to be effectively nonexistent—and it never
connotes a purpose that is subject to a condition which the speaker hopes will not
occur.”241 Saliently for our purposes, Scalia also urged that “[i]t is not at all
236. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including the background of Rule
609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable
disposition . . . was indeed unthought of . . . .”); Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536–42
(2004) (holding that “[t]he plain meaning that § 330(a)(1) sets forth does not lead to absurd results
requiring us to treat the text as if it were ambiguous,” and therefore “[i]f Congress enacted into law
something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent . . .
. In the meantime, we must determine intent from the statute before us.”); Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is nothing
whatever extraordinary—and surely nothing so bizarre as to permit this Court to declare a ‘scrivener’s
error’” in granting natural persons, but not corporations, standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act);
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1097–98 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc) (“We cannot declare Congress’s choice
of the statutory language . . . a clerical error simply because we disagree with the logic of the terms that
Congress used,” since the provision at issue “makes perfect sense; it is fully grammatical and can be
understood by people of ordinary intelligence.”).
237. 526 U.S. 1 (1999).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006).
239. Id.
240. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 3.
241. Id. at 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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implausible that Congress should direct its attention to this particularly savage sort
of carjacking—where killing the driver is part of the intended crime,”242
emphasizing that this hypothetical purpose underlying the statute “was a plausible
congressional purpose in enacting this language—not what I necessarily think was
the real one. I search for a plausible purpose because a text without one may
represent a ‘scrivener’s error’ that we may properly correct.”243
The upshot of this seems to be that Scalia, and the textualists who follow him,
is more than willing “to consult all public materials,” including legislative history,
“to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed
unthought of,”244 but only if he can find no “plausible congressional purpose in
enacting th[e] language.”245 From the perspective of the theory I have been
defending, this threshold requirement of finding absurdity or indeterminacy before
launching a search for other reliable evidence of error is misguided. It seems to
confound the correction of scrivener’s error with the absurdity doctrine: the very
two doctrines I have argued any plausible textualist theory of scrivener’s error must
keep distinct.246
The conceptual justification for the absurdity doctrine is that judges ought to
rescue Congress from the absurd consequences of its improvidently over or underinclusive value choices. Following Manning, I have asserted that this is at war with
textualism’s rejection of strong intentionalism, on the one hand, and commitment
to the faithful agent theory, on the other. But I have argued that the conceptual
justification for correcting a clerical error is quite different: judges and citizens owe
no deference to value choices Congress did not make and did not intend to enact.
And this justification is entirely unconnected to a threshold requirement of facial
absurdity or ambiguity. Such a requirement might be justified on the alternative
ground that it prevents freewheeling use of the power to correct scrivener’s error by
restricting the number of errors courts can correct; but since the restriction is
unconnected with the justification underlying the doctrine, it would be as arbitrary
a restriction as limiting the correction of scrivener’s errors to cases heard on
Tuesdays and Thursdays. While facial absurdity can provide compelling evidence
that a court is faced with a scrivener’s error, the requirement that a court must find
facial absurdity or ambiguity before going on to consider the possibility of error is
rootless and should be abandoned.
A final restriction on the correction of scrivener’s errors occasionally deployed
by textualists fares better. The restriction comes out of Scalia’s dissent from
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,247 which dealt with a provision of the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977,248 which provided
federal criminal penalties for anyone who “knowingly transports or ships in
interstate or foreign commerce . . . any visual depiction . . . involv[ing] . . . a minor
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engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”249 The question facing the court was
whether the statute required that the defendant know that one of the performers in
the “visual depiction” was in fact a minor: that is, does “knowingly” apply not only
to “transports or ships,” but also to the fact that the visual depiction “involves . . . a
minor”?250 The Court held that the scienter requirement did extend to the
performer’s age, despite the fact that this was contrary to the most natural reading
of the text.251
Scalia dissented, rejecting the majority’s ungrammatical reading of the statute.
While admitting that “I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to
acknowledge a doctrine of ‘scrivener’s error’ that permits a court to give an
unusual (though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal
meaning, would produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result,” Scalia
refused to extend that doctrine to this case because the majority’s reading would
“give the problematic text a meaning it cannot possibly bear” and because “the sine
qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine, it seems to me, is that the meaning
genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise
we might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake. That
condition is not met here.”252
Scalia’s first requirement—that the corrected reading cannot give the text a
meaning it cannot bear—starts off down the wrong path. If the theoretical undergirding of the doctrine of scrivener’s error tells us to correct those errors because
they are errors, we should clearly care little about ensuring that the corrected
reading squares with the wording of the text we are finding erroneously-worded in
the first place. That this requirement gets us nowhere can be seen by trying to
apply it to errors that result in deviant texts: textual provisions that are not wellformed and are for that reason unmeaning clearly can bear no meaning, so the
search for a corrected meaning that the text will bear is hopeless.
But Scalia’s second requirement is sound. If a court is to ignore a value choice
seemingly expressed by the text in favor of the value choice it believes Congress
actually meant to enact, it must be sure of what that corrected choice is. This
follows from the two crucial roles played by the statutory text: unless we are sure
of what the actual but erroneously-expressed choice was, we cannot be sure that the
text has enabled a unified legislative intent to form around a value choice. And if
we are unsure of what that choice was, the text clearly has not performed its
function of communicating it to us. If a court enforces its best guess in a situation
like this, it is not deferring to the legislative will; it is legislating from the bench.
Such an exercise of judicial power runs contrary to the theory of authority-asdeference that I have argued underwrites textualism. Confidence about the correct
reading of an erroneously worded statute, then, can very properly be called “the
sine qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine.”253
Generally, near-conclusive proof that an error has occurred will carry with it
near-conclusive proof of the correct reading. At least most of the examples we
249.
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have considered have met this requirement. In Scurto, for example, the very fact
that allowing “unlawful” impeachment of testimony is so obviously an error shows
that the legislature meant to allow “lawful” impeachment.254 Similarly, the high
improbability that the Maryland statute at issue in Maxwell really meant to exempt
nearly all property from taxation also meant that it was highly probable that the
legislature had meant to make all but the specifically exempted classes of property
subject to taxation.255 But when a court is faced with a statute that clearly contains
an error but is unable to ascertain the intended reading of the statute with any
certainty, it should decline both to apply the erroneous text and to invent a
plausible “corrected” text through judicial fiat.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article I have tried to show how an approach to scrivener’s error can
find conceptual room in a textualist theory of statutory interpretation. After
reviewing a few prominent textualist answers to the problem of scrivener’s error, I
concluded that non-fidelity-based reasons for correcting errors are either too
narrow to justify correction of the entire class of errors or too broad to be consistent
with the faithful agent theory, and that fidelity-based reasons are inconsistent with
intent skepticism. Intent-skeptical justifications of textualism are, for this reason,
less desirable than non-skeptical justifications. I then articulated a non-skeptical
argument for textualism that relies on the reasons for according authoritativeness to
legislative value choices and argued that this justification shows why, when faced
with a scrivener’s error, judges ought to enforce the value choice that the
legislature intended to embed in the statutory text rather than the one actually
expressed by the text. Finally, I argued that syntactic deviance, absurdity, and
legislative history are all sources of evidence on which textualist judges may
properly draw to determine the existence of an error but that the judge must also be
sure of what Congress actually meant to say, before she can enforce a corrected
reading of a statute.

254. See Scurto v. Le Blanc, 184 So. 567, 574 (La. 1938).
255. See Maxwell v. State, 40 Md. 273 (Md. 1874).

